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The purpose of this study is to examine does family ownership affect firm’s performance.  The 
topic is highly relevant and interests not only private investors but governments and politicians 
as well. A large portion of the companies around the world is controlled by families. Especially a 
major share of the small and medium size companies is held by families. Even in the largest 
companies, families have a large representation. 
 
Previous literature has recently shown more interest towards the topic. The common view is that 
family firms outperform or have an equal firm performance than other firms. The theory behind 
this, called agency theory supports this view. According to agency theory, a separation of 
ownership and management arise a conflict of interests. As owners try to deal with this conflict 
they are forced to pay costs that are named agency costs. However, while concentrated 
ownership can reduce agency costs, it can cause other types of problems.  
 
I use a sample of 500 biggest companies in Finland to test if family firms’ performance differs 
from other companies. In addition to ROA, I use a performance measure created by Talouselämä 
magazine (TE-grade) that takes into account profitability, solvency and liquidity and creates a 
weighted average from these, where profitability is weighted by 2. Time period for my empirical 
part is 2006-2014. Furthermore, I separate state-owned firms and firms that have a large foreign 
ownership into their separate groups to test how family owned firms compare to them. 
 
The results show that family firms outperform against the whole sample, especially when the 
performance is measured with TE-grade. With ROA, the positive correlation is not that clear. 
Firms with foreign ownership have noticeably higher ROA than all of the other comparison 
groups and a TE-grade similar to family firms.  
______________________________________________________________________  
KEYWORDS: Family firm, Ownership Structure, Agency Theory, Agency Cost.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Families represent the single largest share of shareholders in companies around the world 
(La Porta, Lopez-De-Silane and Shleifer 1999: 511). Ownership structure is a major theme 
in financial articles and among investors. 33 % of listed U.S. companies and 44 % of listed 
European companies are controlled by families (Anderson and Reeb 2003: 1304; Faccio 
and Lang 2002: 365). When the ownership share is large enough, it can be determined that 
a large owner has a control of the company. With large ownership shares, families can hold 
top-management positions and hire people they prefer to manage the company. This 
increases the control they already have over the company. After the current owners in 
family firms grow old they usually pass the ownership to their descendants.  
In addition to families, other large shareholders are usually states or institutional investors 
(Le Porta et al. 1999: 511). Especially states tend to own the largest companies in different 
countries. This might be due to the regulation on some sectors or a historical relic. A 
control over a firm can be acquired in different way and it is not necessarily to own direct 
stocks of the company to have a control over it. Shares with unequal voting rights, pyramid 
structures and cross-holdings enable shareholder to acquire control with smaller ownership 
shares and with indirect investments.    
Ownership structure can have a major effect on company value and performance. This is 
big a concern to other investors. Whether the large owners are passive or active also 
influences the company and other stakeholders. A large shareholder can be a positive 
factor when it comes to monitoring the management to work for the good of the firm. 
However, large shareholders can cause conflicts between themselves and minority 
shareholders. If family or a state owns a significant part of a listed company and is not 
trading with their own share, it can hurt the value of the company for the bidding and 
trading is not efficient. Minority shareholders and small investors have to think if the 
benefits of having a large shareholder outweighs the possible costs.  
1.1 Background and motivation 
Berle and Means (1932) were the first ones to study the effects of ownership structure to 
firm performance. They introduced a theory which argues that separated ownership 
produces unnecessary cost for a company. Costs are occurred when the management of the 
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company is outsourced and owners are not actively involved in the management. It creates 
a conflict of interests between the owners and the management, as the managers do not 
always work for the good of the company, but rather try to keep their job and make as 
much personal profit as possible. This theory was later called agency theory. Agency 
theory states that concentrated ownership reduces costs and increases the value of the 
company. 
Business ownership policy is usually also a question of politics. Governments around the 
world debate what the role for the state as an owner is, or should it have any and whether 
to favor some other ownership types over other, for example: in taxation. In Finland, 
family businesses suffer from high inheritance taxation when the firm is passed down to 
descendants. The Finnish Family Firm Association wants to replace the inheritance tax 
with a profit tax that is not automatically paid when the firm is inherited, but only in a 
situation if the descendants sell the firm after they have inherited it. Extreme opposite 
opinions say that the firm should always be sold in a case of succession, because passing 
the business down to descendants does not bring any additional value to the company.   
1.2 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to find out whether ownership has any effect on firm 
performance or not. To be more specific, I focus on family ownership. By combining 
existing literature and the theoretical framework together with empirical findings I provide 
insight about the ownership in the biggest 500 companies in Finland and how does it affect 
the firm performance. The first part of the thesis will review agency theory as a main 
theory behind the effects ownership structure. Then I focus more on the existing literature 
by reviewing some recent studies with different approaches researching ownership 
structure. Empirical part will compare the firm performance with different ownership 
structures focusing on family firms, firms with foreign ownership and state-owned firms.  
1.3 Finnish markets and ownership in Finland 
Finland is well-known from its mobile and forest industry and its large enterprises, such as 
Nokia, Kone and UPM-kymmene. Recently, when Nokia and the forest industry in Finland 
have been diminishing, other companies have developed new innovations, such as: Angry 
Birds from Rovio and a list of mobile phone apps, i.e. the Hay Day, Clash of Clans and 
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Clash Royal from Supercell. Although Finland is best known from these large companies, 
it is a country with a large portion of small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) that have 
less than 250 employees. Over 90 % of the companies in Finland are SMEs (Hansson, 
Liljeblom and Martikainen 2011: 396).     
A report from Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy written by Tourunen 
(2009) narrates the significance of family firms in Finland. Companies in Finland are 
usually owned by private investors, public entities, cooperatives, state, pension funds, 
institutional investors, churches, foundations, funds and foreign investors. Families own 30 
% of the biggest companies, 46 % of SMEs and 74 % of the companies with at least one 
employee. Tourunen (2009) report states that the share of the Finnish ownership of the 
companies has dropped and the number of firms with foreign investors has been 
increasing.   
Family firms and their performance is a relatively new research topic in Finland. Previous 
studies have focused more on the agency problem and not as much on the effects of family 
ownership in a wider scale. Only during and after the nineties researches began to focus on 
family firms (Heinonen 2003: 12).  
1.4 Hypothesis 
The first hypothesis concentrates on family firms and their performance. The null 
hypothesis is that family ownership does not bring any significant value to the company. 
Alternative hypothesis is supported by agency theory and argues that family ownership 
would bring additional value to the company and family firms would perform better.   
H0 = Family ownership does not have any significant correlation with firm’s performance. 
H1 = Family ownership does have a positive correlation with firm’s performance. 
Second hypothesis continues the first hypothesis by adding other ownership types. The null 
hypothesis is that ownership does not make any significant difference on firm performance. 
Alternative hypothesis is that family firms outperform other ownership types. Existing 
literature usually compares family ownership to all other ownership types and does not 
sample out other ownership structures. As such, alternative hypothesis is therefore not 
strongly supported by previous literature.  
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H0 = There is no difference in firm’s performance among different ownership types.  
H1 = Family firms outperform other ownership types.  
1.5 Contribution  
Most studies that have been conducted of this topic use public stock companies in their 
research. Only few studies use non-listed companies in their data sample. Also, there are 
very few published studies with Finnish data. All the previous masters’ thesis researching 
the effects of ownership structure that I run across with while doing research, were 
conducted by using companies listed in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki. The number of companies 
in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki limits to a bit over 100 companies, whereas I have nearly 500 
companies on my dataset. Furthermore, I use both non-listed and listed firms.  
In addition, while this thesis focuses on family ownership, on the empirical part I examine 
also two other main ownership types in the biggest companies in Finland: large foreign 
owners and state. This thesis will provide insight on how different ownership types affect 
the firm’s performance. It will also give information about different features of these 
companies and how do the companies with other ownership types differ. Dewenter and 
Malatesta (2001) studied the effects of state-ownership and came to a conclusion that state-
owned firms underperform compared to other firms, but because of the political means, 
this can be acceptable. Different owners have different incentives to manage the business 
which also affects firm performance.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Ownership structure is a significant factor that has an effect on firm performance and thus, 
it is a widely studied subject. In this thesis, I review articles that study the effects of family 
ownership on firms’ performance. Some of the previous studies about family ownership 
consider only companies which have founder-CEO, some companies with descendants as 
managers. Some studies combine these ownership types and compare them. Few of the 
existing studies categorize family ownership as ether passive or active. Most of the studies 
are done by examining stock listed companies. The literature review includes studies from 
three different areas: the US, Europa and Asia.  
2.1 Previous studies from the US 
The results from different research papers varies a lot for and against family firms. Studies 
generally use the same types of performance measurements as a dependent variable, such 
as Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q. Independent variables 
can differ significantly and therefore the results are not consistent across the board. Other 
main factors affecting the results are the time period and the area where the data was 
collected from. Fairly commonly accepted view among different studies (Grossman and 
Hart (1986) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986)) is based on agency theory, stating that: 
concentrated ownership can reduce conflicts between owners and management and 
therefore increase firm’s performance. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) challenge this view by 
stating that firm’s ownership structure changes so that it is always aiming to maximize the 
firm’s value. In their study, they find no significant indication that ownership structure 
affects the firm’s performance.  
In addition to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) continue the 
study on relations between ownership structure and firm performance. They take a random 
sample of 223 companies out of 511 companies from the original Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) study. The sample includes companies from all different sectors from the US during 
the 1976-1980. In their regressions, they use Tobin’s Q as a performance measure which 
was not used in the Demsetz and Lehn (1985) paper. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) also 
add leverage, fixed assets and managerial ownership as the new variables in addition to the 
previous ones. Coherent to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Denmsetz and Villalonga (2001) 
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find no significant correlation between firm performance and ownership structure. While 
concentrated ownership can reduce agency conflicts, it has other disadvantages that dilute 
its benefits.  
One of the most cited research paper studying the effects of family control is a study by 
Anderson and Reed (2003). They focus on the effects of founding-family management and 
how does a family-CEO affect the firm’s performance, which is measured by Tobin’s Q 
and ROA.  The sample is from 1992-1999 including 403 companies from the S&P 500 list 
excluding banks and public utilities. The results clearly show that family firms outperform 
nonfamily firms. Despite the size of the company, family firms have 10 % higher Tobin’s 
Q and a higher ROA than nonfamily firms. Based on the study, the firm value increases 
when family member serves as a CEO. However, the correlation between family 
ownership and firm performance is not linear. Family ownership best supports the 
performance when it is under 30 %. After family ownership share is over 30 %, there are 
visible negative effects on the firm performance.   
Different from the previous studies, Villalonga and Amit (2006) study the agency conflicts 
not only between owners and managers, but also between large and small shareholders. 
They aim to solve which of the two types of agency problems is more expensive for the 
minority shareholders. The study uses Fortune 500 companies from the years 1994-2000 
and compares family firms to nonfamily firms. Findings state that family ownership brings 
value to the firm only in certain forms. When founder works as a CEO or as a chairman of 
the board, findings are coherent with Anderson and Reeb (2003). Leading to firm value 
being above normal and agency costs staying small. When the next generation inherits the 
firm and works as CEO or as a chairman of the board, the firm will lose its value. 
According to Villalonga and Amit (2006), it is safer for the minority shareholders to stay 
out of the family firms. Additionally, pyramid structures, dual-class shares and cross-
holdings enable families to use control in family firms and because of these, minority 
shareholders value is decreased.  
A research paper published on the same year with Villalonga and Amit (2006) by Perez-
Gonzalez (2006) supports the findings from Villalonga and Amit (2006) paper. Perez-
Gonzalez (2006) studies the effects that the change of the CEO has on the firm 
performance. The study focuses on the correlation between family CEO and firm 
performance when the CEO position is inherited ether by blood or by marriage and 
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compare this to other firms with externals CEOs. The data sample is from COMPUSTAT-
database from the years 1980-2000. The data includes 335 of all U.S. companies that are 
publicly traded. Incoming CEOs for family firms are divided into two groups by education: 
one group has the CEOs that attended for a graduate program while the other group has the 
CEOs that did not have a graduate level education. Unlike previous studies, Perez-
Gonzalez (2006) uses operating return on assets (OROA) as a main performance measure 
with industry adjusted models and net income to assets and market-to-book ratio as 
secondary performance measures. The results on incoming family CEO’s effects on firms 
performance correlate with Villalonga and Amit (2006) study stating that if the position is 
inherited by blood or marriage, the firm performance suffers. However, there is a 
significant positive difference if the future CEO has a graduate degree. By hiring a CEO 
within the family that has a graduate degree, the operating performance of the firm stays 
more or less at the same level.  
In addition to Villalonga and Amit (2006), agency conflicts between large and small 
shareholders were also studied by Ali, Chen and Radhakrishnan (2007). In their study, Ali 
et al. (2007) examine the companies from S&P 500 between years 1998-2002 dividing the 
sample into 177 family firms and rest as non-family firms. List of the family ownership 
was given by BusinessWeek (2002). As such, the sample classification is similar to my 
study as I also use a list provided by Talouselämä 500 –magazine (2015). A firm is 
classified as a family firm if a family is among the largest shareholders and/or a family 
member serves in the top management or in the board. Ali et al. (2007) highlight that 
family firms suffer less from agency costs between management and owners than other 
firms, but the costs between large and small shareholders are higher in family firms than in 
widely held firms. This statement is congruent with Villalonga and Amit (2006) study 
where they found that agency costs between large and small owners are more expensive for 
investors than agency costs between management and owners. However, Ali et al. (2007) 
results differ from Villalonga and Amit (2006) by saying that family firms managed by 
descendants are more profitable than other firms. According to Ali et al. (2007), overall 
agency costs for family firms that are managed by descendants are still less than in non-
family firms.  
Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester and Cannella Jr. (2007) research the meaning of the 
definition of family firms in the previous studies. They state that it is hard to simplify a 
complex governance structure. Previous literature has a lot of different definitions for 
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family firms and it is hard to sum up one common definition. Additionally, Miller et al. 
(2007) also question: if how the business is defined has a significant importance on the 
results. Their data includes 1000 firms during the years 1996-2000 from Fortune list, as 
well as an alternative sample of 100 randomly selected public companies to test the 
possible bias. The study aims to examine the supposition of the notion that family firms do 
outperform other firms, although they do present a number of contrary results where family 
firms were deemed to underperform. By confirming the founder effect and excluding lone-
founder firms, the study focuses on examining, if there is a positive correlation between 
family ownership and firm performance. Miller et al. (2007) find no evidence that family 
firms would be superior compared to other firms. These results highlight that the definition 
of family firms plays an important role on the results.  
 
Study Data Conclusions 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
 
U.S. 
 
Ownership has no significant 
effect 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) 
  
U.S. 
 
Ownership has no significant 
effect 
Anderson and Reed (2003) S&P 500  
Family firms are at least as 
good  
Villalonga and Amit (2006) Fortune 500  
With founder-CEO, family 
firms are better 
Perez-Gonzalez (2006) COMPUSTAT (U.S.) 
 
Descendant CEO hurts firm 
performance 
Ali, Chen and Radhakrishnan 
(2007) 
S&P 500  Family firms outperform 
Miller, Le Breton-Miller, 
Lester and Cannella Jr. (2007) 
Fortune 1000 
Lone-founder firms 
outperform 
Figure 1. Summary of the previous studies from the US.  
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2.2 Previous studies from Europe 
After presenting few of the most cited and most recent papers researching family firms’ 
performance with U.S. data, I go through most relevant research papers from Europe. 
Maury (2006) compares family firms’ performance with non-family firms using a sample 
of 1672 companies from Western-Europe from years 1996-1999. Firm is defined as a 
family firm if family has control of the management. Findings of the study indicate for a 
better performance for family firms if family holds at least one of two top-management 
positions (CEO or head of the board). Performance was measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
If family is not actively involved in decision making, family ownership has no effect on 
firm’s performance. When family’s control exceeds a certain level the benefits of family 
ownership start to fade and the value of the company decreases. The results of Maury 
(2006) study are very similar with Anderson and Reeb (2003) research, which was 
conducted with U.S. data. Family ownership best serves the company and its shareholders 
if family ownership is relatively small, but the family is still actively involved in the 
management. Growing ownership share of the family might increase the performance of 
the company but not necessarily increase the value of the company and additionally could 
be harmful for other shareholders.  
Barontini and Caprio (2006) conduct a similar study to Maury (2006) using 675 publicly 
traded European companies from 11 different countries across Continental Europe. Time 
period for the study is 1999-2001 and as in most of the previous studies, Barontini and 
Caprio (2006) use Tobin’s Q and ROA as performance measures. According to the study, 
family firms outperform non-family firms in valuation and operating performance. This 
argues with Barclay and Holderness (1989) view that large owners can have a negative 
impact on other investors to bid for the company thus decreasing company’s value. As in 
previous research papers (Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Maury (2006)), the effects of 
family ownership on performance is emphasized when founder sits as a CEO of the 
company or as the head of the board. If descendants are involved in the company, it is 
better they would not to hold a top-management role. If descendants serve as a CEO, 
positive benefits from family ownership are diluted. These results are contradictory with 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Perez-Gonzalez (2006) studies. 
A similar study to Barontini and Caprio (2006) was conducted by Sraer and Thesmar 
(2007) with French stock companies during the years 1994-2000. According to them, as 
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much as two thirds of the listed French companies are controlled by families. In the study, 
family firms were divided into three groups: (1) companies run by a founder-CEO, (2) 
companies inherited and run by descendants, and (3) companies with an external CEO. The 
results show that family firms performed better in each of the three categories compared to 
non-family firms. Performance was measured with ROA, ROE and dividends to profit 
ratio. Market-to-book ratio was used to measure the valuation. Family firms outperformed 
widely held firms in all the categories, but dividend to profit measure. Like previous 
studies, Sraer and Thesmar (2007) confirm the founder effect also in their research. Firms 
managed by the founder outperform all the other companies. The reason for this is 
presented to be superior labor productivity which explains most of the difference. 
Referring to previous literature, Sraer and Thesmar (2007) state that the better performance 
for inherited firms managed by descendants came as a surprise to them.  
Within European studies Barontini and Caprio (2006) and Sraer and Thesmar (2007), 
contradictory results on family firms’ performance were encountered in a Hillier and 
McColgan (2009) study. They research companies listed in London stock exchange 
between years 1992-1998 focusing on the management of the company. The aim is to find 
if there is a difference in family firms’ behavior to hire CEOs or chairmen of the board and 
how does this difference affect the family firms’ performance. Article states that families 
have a high control over the firms they own and they might be poorly managed. Family 
firms tend to hire less external experts for top management positions as well as external 
CEOs or chairmen of the board. This is mentioned to have a negative effect on family 
firms’ performance. In family firms, CEO is more likely to resign because of poor 
performance than in other companies. After the resignation operative business gets better 
and stock prices go up increasing the value for shareholders. In case the leaving CEO is 
also the founder of the company, the stock prices will increase even more than normal. The 
study also finds a significant improvement in the firm operating performance after the 
departure of the family CEO. These results are overall very contradictory with other 
studies, especially the ones focused on the founder effect. Where almost all of the other 
studies confirm that firms with founder-CEO outperform others, Hillier and McColgan 
(2009) find that the resignation of founder-CEO benefits the shareholders the most.  
A large portion of the existing research focuses on large, publicly traded corporations in 
their studies, because it is easy to find the data from these companies. Cucculelli and 
Micucci (2008) use a sample of Italian small and medium-size companies (SMEs). Italy is 
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a country with numerous small manufacturer businesses, making it a perfect setting to 
analyze the effects of family ownership on smaller firms, and to compare if the results are 
consistent with the large corporation samples. The data was collected by a survey. After 
sending a survey to 7500 companies, they received 3548 answers. The study was 
conducted during the years 1994-2004 and the performance measurements used are ROA 
and ROS, because the sample includes also non-listed firms. Cucculelli and Micucci 
(2008) findings are consistent with Villalonga’s and Amit’s (2006) and Perez-Gonzalez’s 
(2006) studies, where the firm performance suffers if descendants inherit the firm. The 
performance suffers more if descendants start to work as the CEO or the chairman of the 
board. By hiring an external manager to manage the firm, inherited family firms would be 
more capable in keeping their existing performance levels. These results are also consistent 
with Miller’s et al. (2007) view where they state that, after excluding the founder effect, 
the results can vary depending on the definition of family firm.  
Hansson, Liljeblom and Martikainen (2011) study the effects of different ownership 
structures with Finnish data. They examined unlisted Finnish enterprises (SMEs) and 
found prove for family firms’ better performance, similar with studies by Maury (2006), 
Barontini and Caprio (2006) and Sraer and Thesmar (2007). The research was conducted 
with a similar method as Cucculelli’s and Micucci’s (2008), by sending a survey for a 
number of companies. After the second round, Hanson et al. (2011) received a total of 982 
responses and after more searching; they found data for 852, which is the total sample for 
their paper. The results show that better performance is highlighted if family member 
serves as a CEO of the company. However, the profitability ratios ROA and ROI will settle 
down in time to match with other companies. This indicates the fact that when descendants 
inherit the firm the profitability of the firm will start to decrease. This validates the founder 
effect. Hanson et al. (2011) contribute to previous literature by surveying the number of 
employed family members in a company and the correlation between the number of 
employed family members and performance. Family owners have a tendency to favor their 
own family members when hiring new people. In the paper, this is said to impair the 
performance of the firms and dilute the positive founder effect if the founder serves as a 
CEO. The more family members work in a family firm the more it harms firm’s 
performance. This highlights the negative feature of family firms, where a member can be 
hired for a positions without a decent know-how.  
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Study Data Conclusions 
Maury (2006) 
 
Western-Europe 
 
Active family ownership has 
a positive effect 
Barontini and Caprio (2006) 
 
Continental Europe 
 
Family firms outperform in 
valuation and profitability 
Sraer and Thesmar (2007) France 
All types of family firm 
outperform  
Hillier and McColgan (2009) 
London stock 
exchange 
Family ownership hurts the 
performance 
Cucculelli and Micucci 
(2008) Italy 
 
Descendant CEO hurts firm 
perfomance 
Hansson, Liljeblom and 
Martikainen (2011) 
Finland Family firms outperform 
Figure 2. Summary of the previous studies from Europe.  
 
2.3 Previous studies from Asia 
Because of the growing status of Asian economy, I represent few of the resent studies from 
Asia considering ownership structure. Fan and Wong (2002) state that the listed companies 
in East Asia generally have large shareholders. According to La porta et al. (1999), 20 % of 
the largest 20 companies in South-Korea are controlled by families. Same number for 
Singapore’s largest 20 companies is 30 % and for Hong Kong it is as high as 70 %. An 
article Ding, Zhang and Zhang (2008) from China also mentions that states and families 
are the two major shareholders in Asia. Ding et al. (2008) compare the performance 
between family owned firms and state-owned firms. Sample period is 1999-2004, which 
were the years that GDP grew heavily in China. Article argues that the large GDP growth 
from China is partly due to the growing private sector. Performance measurements used 
are: revenue to number of employees, revenue to cost of a unit, net profit to employee, 
ROA and market-to-book ratio. The results show that family firms clearly outperform 
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state-owned firms. Especially on the farming and light industry sectors, where private 
companies have been active for longer period of time, family firms have higher 
performance. Heavy industry and chemical industry sectors are doing decently compared 
to others, because private companies were not allowed to do business on these sectors until 
recently.  
On a wider scale, Jiang and Peng (2011) studied the performance of family firms in eight 
East Asian countries. They excluded Japan, because it is too developed compared to rest of 
Asia and China, because most of the companies in China are owned by the state. However 
Jian and Peng (2011) refer to the paper Ding et al. (2008), that recently more and more 
private companies have entered the public markets. The firm performance is measured with 
cumulative stock returns. The article Jian and Peng (2011) finds no significant difference 
between the performance of family owned and other companies. The results vary from 
country to country and therefore a coherent conclusion cannot be made.  
Chu (2011) uses Taiwanese data to research the firm performance of family firms. The 
dataset includes 786 companies and the time period is 2002-2007. Chu (2011) uses ROA to 
measure performance. The findings of the paper are very close with studies done with 
European data (Maury (2006), Barontini and Caprio, (2006), Sraer and Thesmar (2007) 
and Hansson et al. (2011)). As in previous studies, Chu (2011) reports evidence of founder 
effect. Firms with founder working as a CEO or a chairman of the board have the highest 
performance of all companies. If family ownership is passive, it has a negative effect on 
firm performance. Family ownership with active control brings value to the company and 
outperforms others.   
Inconsistent with previous papers, Ibrahim and Samad (2011) research paper finds that 
Malaysian family firms underperform other firms in valuation. Family firms have 
significantly smaller Tobin’s Q. When measured profitability with ROA and ROE, family 
firms have higher ROE, but smaller ROA. The data is from years 1999-2005 and included 
474 companies.  Jiang and Peng (2011) also research Malaysian family firms in their paper 
among other countries. The results are contradictory to Ibrahim and Samad (2011), since 
Jiang and Peng (2011) study showed that Malaysian family firms outperform others. This 
could be reasoned with the use of different performance measures. Whereas Ibrahim and 
Samad (2011) use Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE, Jiang and Peng (2011) used cumulative 
stock returns. Other explanations might be found by examining the data sample and the 
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definition of family firm. As Miller et al. (2007) pointed out in their research, a number of 
variables can change the final results.  
Study Data Conclusions 
Ding, Zhang and Zhang (2008) 
 
China 
 
Family firms outperform 
Jiang and Peng (2011) 
 
East Asia 
(8 countries) 
Mixed results from different 
countries 
Chu (2011) Taiwan  
Family firms are at least as 
good  
Ibrahim and Samad (2011) Malysia  
Family firms underperform in 
valuation 
Figure 3. Summary of the previous studies from Asia.  
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3. DIFFERENT FORMS OF OWNERSHIP  
Ownership can have many different structures and forms around the world. Historical 
factors are one big reason for this variation. In some countries state and banks have a big 
role as owners, whereas in other countries families control a large share of the companies. 
La Porta et al. (1999) studied ownership structure within 27 wealthy countries. They 
noticed that only in countries with high shareholder protection, the companies are widely 
held. A majority of the companies in these 27 countries are managed ether by a family or 
the state. Controlling owners have usually big impact on the firm’s management compared 
to their cash flow rights. This is said to be mainly because of pyramid structures and active 
management. 
In this chapter, I go through different ownership structures in different continentals and 
provide insight on how they can affect the control of the company. In Europe and in Asia 
the pyramid structure enables to control a firm even without a direct 50 % ownership share. 
Shares with different voting rights are also one way to secure the control over a firm.  
3.1 The relationship between ownership and control 
United States and United Kingdom represent countries with high level of shareholder 
protection and thereby the company ownership in these countries is very wide. Large 
corporations have numerous shareholders and one shareholder can have more voting power 
than others only because they own more shares. In some places the ownership structures 
can be more complicated, because one share can have larger voting power than other type 
of shares.  (Brealey, Myers and Allen 2011: 882–883) 
In Asia, the concentration level of ownership is high. Additionally, ownership and control 
can be highly divided. This can be because of different pyramid structures and dual-class 
shares. Japanese companies diverge significantly from other Asian companies (Fan and 
Wong 2002: 420). Many economies of Asian countries are controlled by wealthy families. 
In Hong Kong, largest 10 families control 32 % of the listed companies. In Thailand, 
largest 10 families own 46 % and Indonesia, largest 10 families own almost 58 % of the 
listed companies. In Asia families do not necessarily need to own majority of a company in 
order to control the company. They can gain control to the company by using pyramid 
structures, cross-holdings or shares with superior voting rights. (Brealey et al. 2011: 887) 
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Because Japan differs considerably from the rest of Asia, it is usually dealt as its own. The 
reason why Japan is different from the rest of Asia is a network of companies called 
“keiretsu”. Typically keiretsu is organized by a large bank. Bank or other institutional 
investors own generally shares from companies that are a part of their keiretsu. Companies 
from the same network tend to favor each other when doing business. A common factor for 
these companies is that a big part of their liabilities is offered by the bank organizing the 
keiretsu or other financial institutions inside the keiretsu. Managers of the companies sit in 
boards of other companies and this increases the coherence of the network. (Brealey et al. 
2011: 883–884) 
3.2 Pyramid structure  
Companies owning other companies form pyramids. Operating company is usually in the 
bottom of the pyramid and above it is usually a holding company that might be owned by 
another holding company. This structure can have a lot of layers and make the pyramid 
very complex. Control is used by having ownership or management positions in other 
companies. Pyramids are typically formed, when a family company succeeds and the 
family decides to found a holding company or decides to buy a part of another company 
(Almeida and Wolfenzon 2006: 2664). Pyramid structures are common in Asian and in 
some parts of Europe. (Brealey et al. 2011: 887–888) 
Pyramid structure can enable to control a large share of the company with a small 
investment. For example, in a three layer pyramid with one operating company and two 
holding companies on top of it, one can control a 100 million dollar company with only a 
26 million dollar investment. If the first holding company owns 51 % of the second 
holding company, which again owns 51 % of the operating company, it is possible to fully 
control the operating company through the first holding company. In this case the 
ownership share is only 26 % (0,51 x 0,51 = 0,26 = 26 %). It is also possible to control a 
company with less than 50 % share, which reduces the percentage needed to control a 
bottom company in a pyramid even more.  (Brealey et al. 2011: 888) 
3.3 Shares with unequal voting rights 
The ownership in publicly listed companies is divided to shares. Owning a share means 
owning a part of the company. Publicly traded shares have usually equal rights but in some 
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cases, same company can have different types of shares in its capital and these shares can 
have different features. These shares are typically not a part of public trading and they may 
give the owner multiple votes compared to a normal share. Publicly traded shares usually 
have one share one vote –principal, whereas shares with greater voting rights can give ten 
votes for one share. Owner with smaller number of shares can still have control over the 
business. (Masulis, Wang and Xie 2009: 1700) 
Unequal shares are commonly used in Canada, Denmark, South-Korea, Switzerland, Italia, 
Sweden, Finland, Brazil, Norway and Germany. They might appear in other countries such 
as United States, United Kingdom, Chile, Hong Kong, Australia, South-Africa and France, 
but they are not so common in these counties. Countries like Japan, Belgium, Spain, 
Singapore and China have prohibited the use of shares with unequal voting rights.  
(Brealey et al. 2011: 889) 
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4. AGENCY THEORY 
Most studies reflect their hypothesis and possible findings to agency theory when 
researching about ownership and how different owners and ownership structures affect the 
companies’ performance. Agency theory examines the effects when owners do not manage 
the company by themselves, but rather use agents to do that. This scenario is highlighted in 
the big public companies, where there are thousands of small owners. (Berk, DeMarzo and 
Harford 2012: 11–13.) In addition to the conflicts between the owners and the managers, 
there is a type II agency problem. Type II agency problem occurs between minority and 
majority shareholders. Large shareholders can use their power for their own interests and 
in some cases this might reduce the value for small shareholders. Berle and Means (1932) 
were the first ones to study the effects that ownership has on performance of the company. 
They spoke about the conflicts between the owners and the management and brought out 
the possible costs that might occur when the agents manage the company and not the 
owners. The term “agency theory” has become more common in the later research papers.  
4.1 Agency problem between owners and management 
When a business grows and ages, it usually leads to a separation of the management and 
ownership. A separated ownership leads to a situation where the owners will hire an 
outside manager (agent) to lead the company on behalf of the owners (principals). In many 
cases this is not an optimal situation for the owners as the managers may go for the 
solutions that are more suitable for them, but not for the owners. This will lead to an 
agency problem between the owners and the managers, referred as a type I agency 
problem. In the worst case, this will bring unnecessary costs for the owners. The most 
common example of this scenario are large, global, multimillion publicly listed 
corporations. They can have millions of small owners who all have an insignificant share 
of the company and the company is therefore managed by outside agents hired by the 
company. (Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2014: 6.) 
The purpose of a company is to create profit for the company and maximize shareholders’ 
value. However, aiming to maximize the value of the company is not necessarily the best 
option for the managers of the company. This conflict of interest causes costs for the 
company. The theory that tries to explain these costs is called agency theory. (Copeland, 
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Weston and Shastri 2005: 449–450.) Because of this conflict of interests, a company must 
have right kind of incentives for the managers so that by maximizing the shareholders’ 
value, they will also benefit themselves. This will encourage them to work for the benefits 
of the owners, as managers will also benefit. The scenario would be easier to implement if 
the top management or just CFO had full power over a company’s important decisions. 
Delegating the tasks to only one certain person or a team in a large company is hardly 
possible for the following reasons (Brealey et al. 2011: 319–320):  
1) Large companies can have numerous amounts of different projects from which to 
choose. The top management would never have time to go through all of them. They must 
rely on reports and analysis done by other teams.  
2) The top management does not necessarily have the information and knowledge needed 
to be able to make big decisions affecting the company. For instance, if the company 
would decide to build a new factory, the managers would hardly be able to make a good 
decision regarding on where to build it. There are a lot of different factors involved and 
therefore these kinds of decisions are made in their own departments. In this case, the 
decision would be made in the logistic department.  
3) Some investments might not be in the capital budget. For example marketing aimed for 
expanding a market, securing old customers, research and development and training your 
own workforce.  
4) The top management and local managers make decisions on different basis. The local 
plant manager thinks more about securing their business on that area and not so much of 
the big picture. However, they have more knowledge when it comes down to knowing their 
own business area and how the plant works.  
5) The top management can also make decisions based on their own interests and not the 
owners’. They can be affected by the same seduction the lower levels and therefore letting 
the top management make all the decisions is in wain.   
However good the incentives are, the managers still might not always work for maximizing 
the shareholders’ value. They might genuinely try to do so, but as they work for aiming to 
maximize the shareholders’ value, they will come across with different enticements to 
work more for themselves than for the company (Brealey et al. 2011: 319–320): 
 
28 
 
 
 
 
Laziness. Going through and analyzing various projects is a hard task and requires a lot of 
effort. The manager could be tempted to take a shortcut and choose the first one that looks 
good with a quick look. He could spend more time researching the project that he has 
already picked, but does not necessarily look closely enough for other alternatives.   
Benefits. If we assume that our manager does not get any bonuses, only a standard monthly 
salary, he may acquire bonuses to himself in different measures by putting too much 
money for customer meetings, flying in first class, driving a luxury sport car paid by the 
company and so on. Especially during good times, when bonuses could be large, 
temptation to acquire bonuses on their own is large.  
Bigger is better. Ignoring other perks, it is safe to say that managers prefer to be managers 
in a large company rather than small. Bigger however is not always better. Expanding 
business can reduce profit margins. Additionally, managers tend to be reluctant to reduce 
the number of units, departments or areas that they are in charge of.  
Projects for own personal interest. Person making a choice between different projects is 
easily seduced to choose the project that interest her or him the best and that matches hers 
or his abilities the best. One can also make the decision based on their future role in the 
project. If the project requires outside help and the decisions maker’s role reduces the 
person is more tempted to pick to projects that requires more of their talent.   
Risk taking. Managers usually have more to lose if the company suffers than owners have. 
Shareholders generally divide their holdings to different companies and are more willing to 
take risk than managers. Managers get their living from the company and losing a job 
could lead to a catastrophe. Thus, choosing less risky projects is safer for the managers 
although high risky projects could be more beneficial.  
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Figure 4. Agency problem and conflicts.  
 
4.2 Agency problem between small and large owners  
Ownership shares are seldom divided equally between owners. Especially, if the company 
is a large publicly held corporation. Different owners can be individual investors, families, 
financial institutions and states. Because in the last hand, owners are the ones making 
decisions regarding company’s operations, there is a clear gap between large and small 
shareholders. Large owners can easily make decisions that benefit their actions relentless 
of the consequences that small shareholders could suffer.  If a large shareholder itself is 
widely held, the benefits from the large ownership stake are diluted among various 
individuals. These widely held large shareholders could be banks, financial institutions or 
other holding or public companies. Thus, the incentives for buying shares from other 
shareholders are small. So is also the interest of monitoring the management. The problem 
starts to circle and leads back to the type I agency problem. For family companies the 
incentives to buy other shares and monitor managers are higher and therefore the type I 
agency problem is likely to be stronger than the type II agency problem. (Villalonga and 
Amit 2006: 387) 
When a firm is owned by a family, the owners are more interested in controlling the 
business than in other cases, where the business is not owned by a family. Family strives to 
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strengthen their control over a company by placing own family member in the top 
positions in the company, for example in the board or as a CEO. The boards of family 
firms are generally controlled by the family members and are more independent than other 
boards (Anderson and Reeb 2003: 1306). This enhances the family control over the 
company and increases possible conflicts between the family and other smaller 
shareholders. Because the family wants to secure their position in the company’s decision 
making, they can be sometimes willing to do unethical acts such as manipulating 
company’s accounting to make it look as the family control is not reason for possible 
negative cash flows (Ali et al. 2007: 239). 
4.3 Agency costs 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe an agency relationship as an agreement where an 
outside person is authorized to act for another person or persons in a situation where the 
principal gives a right to an agent to make decisions on hers or his behalf. In a situation 
where both parties aim to maximize their own benefits, it is reasonable to consider that the 
agent will not always make decisions that are best for the principal. Agency costs are made 
in order to make sure that the agent works on principal’s benefit. The agents are usually 
provided by different kind of incentives to get them closer to a situation where working for 
their own personal interest benefits the owners and other way around. However good the 
incentives are, it is inevitable that the agent does not make a wrong decision for the 
principal at some point. Therefore, principals will have to monitor the job done by the 
agent and this leads to agency costs.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) divide agency costs in to three categories: 
1) Monitoring costs 
2) Costs of the incentives 
3) The residual loss 
Agency costs raised from the acts of the managers are easily reduced by monitoring and 
controlling the agents. Problems arise when responsibility of the monitoring is on owners 
who do not have as much knowledge or expertise as the top management. The money spent 
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on the monitoring is beneficial for a certain point, as from which point onwards the costs 
from monitoring outweigh the gained benefits. (Brealey et al. 2011: 320.) 
Agency costs brought out by the agency problem cannot be totally eliminated by 
monitoring alone. Other measures need to be used in order to commit the management to 
maximize the value for the shareholders. The managers are usually provided by different 
salary and bonus arrangements where their paid is linked to the value of the company. By 
maximizing the company’s value they will also get more salary. Thus, working for their 
own interest, they work also for the best interest for the shareholders. In some cases, 
temptations for a greater bonus can lead the managers to work again for their own interest 
by manipulating the information handed out from the company in a hope for a better stock 
price. The managers can also be more reluctant to give away any bad news with the 
intention of maximizing their own profits. (Bodiey et al. 2014: 6-7; Brealey et al. 2011: 
324–326.) 
Ang, Cole and Lin (2003) examine the results from Jensen at al. (1976) paper. In their own 
paper Ang et al. (2003) prove the existence of agency costs by going through 1708 small 
companies. The basis of the study is a company where the owner-manager has total 100 % 
equity of the company and so the agency costs will be zero. These companies are then 
compared to other companies where ownership stakes are divided partly or widely. The 
results of the study state that the agency costs do exist. The costs are significantly higher 
when on outside agent is managing the firm. The study also states that if the ownership 
share for the largest owner is small, the costs will be higher. Additionally, there is a 
positive correlation between the number of outside shareholders and the agency costs.  
4.3.1 Agency cost of debt 
Typical agency conflicts are ether between the owners and the managers or between the 
large and the small owners. In addition to these, also debt holders have their own interest 
and desires on how the company should be managed and on which projects it should 
invest.  This causes agency problem between equity and debt holders, which can have its 
own effects on firm’s performance. Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2003) were first ones to 
study this issue. They compare agency cost of debt between founding family companies 
and other companies and declare that the founding family companies have significantly 
smaller costs for debt than the other companies. Anderson et al. (2003) reason that it is 
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because of the fact that family companies have higher interest to keep the business 
operating and therefore they take fewer risks which benefits debt holders.  
Agency theory clearly states that if the ownership of the company is divided by several 
different owners and agents manage the company, the company will suffer from the 
conflict of interest. Agency costs are smaller if the owners manage the firms and in theory, 
non-existent if the owner has a 100 % equity stake of the company. However, while agency 
theory states that widely divided ownership structure is bad for the company, this may not 
always be the case. Large variation in the ownership structure can have benefits that 
agency theory does not take into account. On the other hand, it can cause other costs if the 
ownership is concentrated only for few individuals. In the next chapter I go through some 
possible pros and cons for divided and concentrated ownership structure.  
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5. POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF FAMILY OWNERSHIP 
In this chapter I go through different factors related to ownership structure that might have 
an effect on how family firms perform against other kind of companies with different 
ownership structures. Family firms are just one type of companies where one party has a 
significant voting power for the company’s decisions. Other big owners can be for 
example: states, financial institution, pension funds or other companies. Regarding to 
agency theory, these kinds of companies should perform better because of fewer agency 
costs. Agency theory is a theoretic frame for this study, which does not consider any 
possible benefits for widely divided ownership structure, nether any possible disadvantages 
for companies with controlling owner(s). This section gives insight on the different factors 
related to ownership structure affecting firm performance.   
5.1 Definition of family business  
Previous literature has a large number of different definitions of family business. Overall 
view is that family has to be able to control the strategic decisions. Some research papers 
use different definitions in their studies by dividing family firms for example based on 
passive or active ownership or based on the ownership stake or the fact if a family member 
holds a top management role (Maury (2006)). A number of studies have similar definitions 
for family firms. Anderson and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Sraer and 
Thesmar (2007) studied the effects of founder-family presence in the company and used a 
family firm definition if the founder-family is still a large shareholder and/or has a 
presence in the top management.  
Miller et al. (2007) undergo 28 papers concerning family ownership. All of these papers 
use a slightly different criteria for family business. Some research papers have a criteria of 
20 % ownership stake (Villalonga and Amit (2006) and La porta et al. (1999)), whereas 
other paper have a minimum requirement of 5 % (Perez-Gonzalez (2006)), 33 % (Barth, 
Gulbrandsen and Schone (2005)) or even 50 % of the ownership (Ang, Cole and Lin 
(2000)). Miller et al. (2007) argue that the significance for the definition is prominent. By 
exploring the effects of the different definitions they conclude that the results are 
dependent on the definition criteria. By changing the criteria for family business it is 
possible to alter the results the family ownership has for the firm performance.  
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This thesis defines the ownership type based on the Talouselämä 500 –magazine which 
follows the definition guidelines from Finnish Family Firms Association that uses same 
criteria as The European commission. The European Commission (2016) has four common 
definitions of family business: 
1) The majority of decision-making rights are in the possession of the natural person(s) 
who established the firm, or in the possession of the natural person(s) who has/have 
acquired the share capital of the firm, or in the possession of their spouses, parents, child, 
or children’s direct heirs. 
2) The majority of decision-making rights are indirect or direct. 
3) At least one representative of the family or kin is formally involved in the governance of 
the firm. 
4) Listed companies meet the definition of family enterprise if the person who established 
or acquired the firm (share capital) or their families or descendants possess 25 per cent of 
the decision-making rights mandated by their share capital. 
5.2 Possible pros for family firms 
According to agency theory, companies with large shareholders should suffer less costs 
than companies with numerous small shareholders. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) support this 
claim by noticing that large shareholders have bigger interests to minimize the agency 
costs. Especially families are usually closely connected to their company and are more 
eager to reduce the costs and to get rid of any freeloaders. When the wellbeing of the 
family is dependent on the company, the interest to secure the future are very high.  
Family that founds the company tends to hold on to their control for a long period of time. 
Compared to small investors or private equity investors who divide their risks among 
different projects and companies, family owned firms have a longer time period to manage 
the company. Investors hope to see more risk taking and large profits, whereas family 
members strive to keep the business healthy and operative for future generations. Time 
frame affects investment decisions and family firms invest rather to projects that can last 
for long periods of time than aim for short period returns. (Anderson and Reeb 2003: 
1305.) Stakeholders value long term partners that invest with long time period. Companies 
 
35 
 
 
 
 
that have longer time frame when choosing projects are not so sensitive for risks. 
Therefore, family firms have higher changes of getting loan and easier to get business 
partners. (Anderson, Mansi and Reeb 2003: 283.) 
The ownership shows itself differently to stakeholders when there is a person or a family 
creating a face for the company’s owners. Family firms are not faceless like widely held 
corporations or financial institutions and this affects business relations. Different 
stakeholders and customers recognize the owners, which has been seen as a positive thing. 
Ownership with a face creates responsibility to take care of your own stakeholders also 
when the economy is dragging. This reduces the risk for stakeholders and thus reduces 
agency costs. The other side of the coin is that a responsible owner can be reluctant of 
letting go of bad or unnecessary business associates or might postpone needed changes 
because of stakeholders’ pressure. In this case, the company suffers in a long term and 
therefore also the stakeholders will suffer. (Kinnunen, Laitinen, Laitinen, Leppiniemi, 
Puttonen 2011: 167–168)  
5.2.1 Company size effect 
Many studies have examined the correlation between company size and firm performance 
and valuation. Almost all of the studies share a common view that risk adjusted returns for 
smaller companies are better that for large companies (Knupfer and Puttonen 2012: 168–
169). Smaller companies outperform bigger companies. In general, smaller companies are 
owned by fewer people and represent more the concentrated ownership. Also, the family 
ownership is more common form among smaller companies. A large portion of family 
firms are small or medium size businesses. When company grows and expands, its 
ownership structure starts to become more and more widely held. (Jiang and Peng 2011: 
16)  
Because small companies outperform large ones and most of the family firms are small 
firms, it could be assumed that family firms would outperform other firms. Even though I 
use a sample of 500 biggest companies in Finland, the company size effect can influence 
the results. However, I will not pay a lot of interest on the company size effect, because 
among the 500 biggest companies, the size effect should be relatively low. It is also 
interesting to see if the companies with different ownership structures differ from each 
other for example in size. The variation of other factors can also influence the firm 
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performance. It is safe to say that ownership as its own factor does not greatly influence 
firm performance directly but through other factors.  
5.3 Possible cons for family firms 
A significant share of the ownership offers owners the right to determine financial 
decisions for the company. Large shareholders are able to make decisions that benefit 
themselves but are harmful for smaller shareholders or even for the company. Fama and 
Jensen (1985) examine how large shareholders may have different interests when making 
decisions than smaller shareholders. Small shareholders are expected to calculate the net 
present value for the projects by following generally approved valuation methods and by so 
maximizing the value of the company. Large shareholders, such as families are more often 
interested in the growth and the continuity of the company and research and development 
than just maximizing the value.  
Barclay and Holderness (1989) point out, that a large shareholder can have affect others 
interests to bid for a company. This automatically reduces the value of the company 
because the trading is not efficient. The liquidity problem caused by a large shareholder is 
also documented by Attig, Fong, Gadhoum and Lang (2006) where they note that large 
shareholders can have selfish motives leading to a larger information asymmetry. Large 
shareholder can be keen to the company and is not willing to trade on their share of the 
stocks. Therefore only a portion of the stocks is available for trading. This has an 
increasing effect on bid-ask spread for the stock of the company thus reducing the liquidity 
of the stock. This view is also supported by Bhide (1993). According to his paper, large 
shareholders may have the ability to reduce agency costs but having a large shareholder 
hurts the liquidity of the stock because of the information asymmetry.  
Anderson and Reeb (2003) state that especially families are eager to manage the company 
they own by themselves. Hence, the company’s management is mostly family members. In 
this situation, the control of the company does not vary as it would in a widely held 
company and same persons can be in charge of the company for many years in a row. In 
the family companies the variations in the top management is smaller and it is harder to get 
to the top than in other companies. This will increase the change of a pernicious CEO to 
keep managing the firm. In their paper, Hillier and McColgan (2009) find that if a 
 
37 
 
 
 
 
company fires a family CEO, the stock value increases and operating performance 
improves.  
Publicly listed companies have the possibility to modify their balance sheet and capital 
structure. Families usually have most of their capital already tied to the company, so 
issuing more shares is not so easy for family firms. Family firms are also exposed to so 
called “incompetent son” –problem. If the next person to lead the company is elected 
inside the family, there is a risk that the person is not the best suitable person, or in worst 
case does not have necessary skills and the company suffers significant losses. (Kinnunen 
et al. 2011: 168)  
A case study of the Times Mirror Company (TM) by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) 
focuses on the effects of the company performance of TM after hiring an outside CEO. TM 
had had eight bad years before hiring an outside CEO. In three years after the new CEO, 
the abnormal stock price proliferation was more than 150 %. The owner family has the 
opportunity to redeem the company’s wealth below cost, take advantage of the nearby 
business district and cash out additional dividends. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) claim 
that the willingness to cash extra dividends out of the company may affect the possibilities 
for the company to grow, thus leading to a poorer performance and underappreciation of 
stock price.  
5.4 Endogeneity 
Previous studies about family ownership have brought up a question about the endogeneity 
of the results where the results may be affected by reversed causality. Families might be 
more encouraged to keep their ownership shares during good times and sell when the 
company performance is not so good. In regression results, this will improve the firm 
performance of family firms compared to other firms. Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
recognize the possibility that families may exit the company before or during a recession. 
Families generally have a good view of the industry segment and they hold access to inside 
information about the company, which may lead them to sell their holdings when the 
company is looking good from outside. This scenario is also speculated by Adams, 
Almeida and Ferreira (2009). They study Founder-CEO effect and point out that Founder-
CEO is more likely to sell the company when the business is going good. They point out 
also another explanation for this where they argue that because people want to retire rich 
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and financially stable, they are more provoked to sell the company when it is in good 
shape.  
The problem of endogeneity is hard to study and therefore it is merely speculated on 
previous literature. Andres (2008) questions the issue of endogeneity for few reasons. 
Families have held their ownership stakes on a same level for over many years. In both 
Andres (2008) and Anderson and Reeb (2003) papers families have hold their ownership 
on average about 80 years. The average ownership stake for families in Andres (2008) 
paper where the data was collected from Germany from years 1998-2004 remains around 
60 % during the whole sample period. These indicate that families are not interested to sell 
their holdings during bad times, but rather they have a longer time horizon for their 
business which makes them hold their ownership stake during good and bad periods. There 
is even evidence that families increase their shares in bad economical slopes when they 
have a possibility to buy shares with low price.    
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6. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This section of the thesis has the empirical part of the thesis. Main focus for the empirical 
part is to find whether there is a correlation between family ownership and firm 
performance and is this correlation negative or positive. Furthermore, this study examines 
effects of alternative ownership types focusing on state and foreign ownership.  
6.1 Data description 
Dataset for this thesis has 468 Finnish companies including listed and non-listed firms. The 
list of companies is collected by using a list from Talouselämä 500 -magazine (TE500) of 
the 500 biggest Finnish companies. The list has 500 biggest companies based on revenue 
reported from the year 2014. Following the previous studies (see, e.g. Anderson and Reeb 
(2003), or Villalonga and Amit (2006)), I have excluded financial and insurance companies 
from the TE500 list. Sample period is from the years 2006-2014. Dummy variables for 
different ownership types are collected from the list provided by Talouselämä 500 
magazine. Other variables are collected by using the Orbis database.  Total number of 
firm-year observations is 4212.  
Most family firms are small and owned by one or few people. The percentage of family 
firms decreases in bigger companies. According to European Commission (2016), over 60 
% of all the companies are family businesses. Table 1 shows that families control about 24 
% of all the TE500 companies. State is a major owner in 9 % of the companies and foreign 
investors in 42 % of the companies. European Commission states, that a listed company 
meets the requirement for a family business, if 25 % of the voting rights are possessed by 
the same family members that or their descendants. Non-listed firms can be seen as family 
businesses if at least one family member is involved in the operative business in the 
company.  
 
Table 1. Ownership types for TE500 companies.  
 
Family firms Foreign owner State-owned All firms 
Number of firms 114 197 40 468 
% of all firms 24 % 42 % 9 % 100 % 
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6.2 Firm performance measures 
Previous studies usually have a sample with only listed companies in it. Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001), Adresson and Reeb (2003) and Maury (2006) all use Tobin’s Q as a 
performance measure in their papers. Tobin’s Q is parallel to book-to-market ratio with an 
exception that it takes the whole value of assets into account, not just the book value of 
general stocks. It is can be calculated dividing market value of assets by estimated 
replacement cost (Bodie et al. 2014: 593.) Because in my thesis I use also non-listed firms, 
I will not be using Tobin’s Q. Instead I focus more on return on assets (ROA) and a 
measure created by TE500 that is a combination of return on investment (ROI), solvency 
ratio and current ratio.  
6.2.1 Return on Assets 
Among Tobin’s Q, ROA is one the most commonly used performance measures in this 
field of research. For example, Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Maury (2006) use ROA as 
an alternative measure for Tobin’s Q and a study by Hansson et al. (2011) using a dataset 
of non-listed Finnish firms uses ROA as a performance measure. ROA focuses more on the 
profitability, whereas Tobin’s Q and market-to-book and book-to-market measures are 
more value measures. Because I use both listed and non-listed firms, I focus on the 
operating performance and exclude the valuation measurements. ROA measures how 
profitable the firm is compared to its assets. (Ross, Westerfield and Jordan 2013: 64.) 
 
(1) Return on assets =   
 
6.2.2 Talouselämä 500 grade 
Talouselämä 500 –magazine (TE500) grades the biggest 500 companies each year using 
their own performance measure Talouselämä-grade (TE-grade). TE-grade considers main 
measures for profitability, solvency and liquidity. It is a combination of three key figures: 
 
Net income 
Total assets 
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(2) Return on investment =  
 
(3) Solvency ratio =   
 
(4) Current ratio =                      
 
Each of the ratios is graded on a scale 4–10.  TE-grade is a weighted average of these 
grades so that return on investment (ROI) is weighted by 2. Therefore TE-grade takes a 
value between 4 and 10. Higher the number, better the firm has performed overall. To my 
knowledge, none of the previous studies or thesis has used TE-grade as a performance 
measure.  
6.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 represents summary statistics for different firms with different ownership types. 
The values are average numbers and the last part named as all firms, includes also other 
firms than just family, foreign or state owned. Revenue and total assets are rounded up to 
hundreds of thousands. Solvency ratio is calculated by dividing equity by total assets.  
 
Table 2. Summary statistics for different firms.  
 
Family firms Foreign owner State-owned All firms 
ROA % 6,73 8,62 7,51 7,23 
TE-grade 8,11 7,96 7,50 7,82 
Revenue (1000 €) 432 700  318 200  585 800 680 800 
Total assets (1000 €) 344 100 267 400 1 129 300 627 100 
Number of employees 1 998 930 1 948 2 091 
Solvency ratio % 44,5 37,1 40,9 40,6 
Net income + interest 
Invested capital 
Equity 
Total assets 
Financial assets + inventories 
short-term liabilities 
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According to table 2, family firms have lowest profitability measured by ROA, but highest 
overall grade from TE500. One explanatory factor is that family firms have the best 
solvency ratio and TE-grade takes solvency into account. Firms with foreign investors as 
controlling owners seem to have the best profitability, but the lowest solvency. 
Furthermore, foreign investors also seem to own rather small companies. Total assets and 
number of employees are noticeably smaller for firms with foreign ownership that for other 
companies. In addition, family firms tend to be smaller on average than all firms. State-
owned firms represent a group of the largest companies by fare.  
6.4 Methodology 
Main focus for my thesis is the possible difference between performance of family and 
non-family companies. Second main interest is to see if other ownership types have any 
effect on firm performance. I conduct a multivariate analysis and I use dummy variables to 
demonstrate different ownership types. The regression model I use is similar to Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) model and is as follows: 
(5) Firm Performance = β0 + β1 (Family Firm) + β2 (Foreign Owner) + β3 (State-owned) 
+ β4 (Control Variables) + εi 
where Firm Performance is measured by ROA and TE-grade. Variables Family Firm, 
Foreign Owner and State-owned are binary variables that take value 1 if the company’s 
ownership status matches the variable and 0 if not. Control Variables include logarithmic 
values of total assets and revenue, number of employees and solvency ratio that is 
calculated by dividing equity with total assets. I use White-cross section to correct the 
heteroscedasticity and period fixed effects. In robust section I use cross-section weights in 
order to increase the adjusted R-squared and therefore I have excluded period fixed effects 
from those regressions.  
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7. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section will include the regression results for the empirical part. First I do a univariate 
test with mean test using three main ownership types including family, foreign and state 
owners and other variables. Table 4 shows the correlations between main variables with t-
values included. In the multivariate section, I use a model descripted in the methods 
section with two different independent performance variables: ROA and TE-grade. The 
results are reported in tables 5 and 6. Furthermore I do robust test to see if the results hold 
when I exclude extreme values from the independent variable.  
7.1 Univariate tests 
Table 3 shows summary statistics for different firms and the results from mean test. It 
includes mean, median, standard deviation and the score from t-test for all the main 
variables. Mean test is calculated by comparing mean values between all firms and firms 
with specific ownership types. It is noticeable, that all firms include also firms from the 
comparison group and therefore some of the mean test results may be higher or lower than 
it would be if comparing only to other firms. Especially firms with foreign ownership 
represent a large portion of the sample, so the t-values for firms with foreign ownership 
can be biased. Nevertheless, table 3 gives a good view over the whole data sample. 
The results from table 3 strengthen the results from table 2. Family firm do have a 
significantly higher TE-grade compared to all firms, with smallest standard deviation. 
When measuring performance by profitability, only statistically significant difference from 
the whole sample is that firms with foreign ownership outperform others. Although 
solvency ratio is worst for foreign owned firms and best for family firms, is does not seem 
have a negative impact on profitability. In the matter of fact, it seems to have a significant 
negative correlation on profitability. Furthermore, foreign investors have a tendency to 
own smaller firms. All of the size measures are significantly smaller for foreign owned 
firms, which indicate that foreign investors are not interested to own the largest companies 
in Finland. Other reason is that the largest companies in Finland are owned by the state. In 
general, revenue, total assets and number of employees all have a negative correlation to 
profitability. It may be concluded that smaller firms within the biggest 500 companies in 
Finland perform better than the biggest companies.  
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Table 3. Summary statistics and mean tests.  
    Family Firms Foreign owner State-owned All Firms 
Firms  
 
114 197 40 468 
ROA % Mean 6,73 8,62 7,51 7,23 
 
Median 6,22 6,57 3,61 5,63 
 
Standard deviation 8,86 15,66 15,36 12,60 
 
t-Test -1,14 3,39*** 0,37 
 
      TE-grade Mean 8,11 7,96 7,50 7,82 
 
Median 8,40 8,40 7,60 8,10 
 
Standard deviation 1,23 1,44 1,43 1,37 
 
t-Test 5,32*** 2,56** -3,78*** 
 
      Revenue Mean 432 732 318 221 585 823 680 802 
(1000 €) Median 177 287 169 255 188 206 187 209 
 
Standard deviation 761 716 496 096 1 036 982 2 387 561 
 
t-Test -3,12*** -5,93*** -0,69 
 
      Total assets Mean 344 093 267 432 1 129 338 627 113 
(1000 €) Median 114 346 107 264 304 148 140 862 
 
Standard deviation 726 974 667 264 3 558 723 2 292 829 
 
t-Test -3,71*** -6,08*** 3,52*** 
 
      No. of  Mean 1 998 930 1 948 2 091 
employees Median 637 425 298 554 
 
Standard deviation 5 432 1 950 4 959 6 467 
 
t-Test -0,40 -6,76*** -0,37 
 
      Solvency ratio  Mean 44,5 37,1 40,9 40,6 
% Median 43,7 35,2 40,6 39,7 
 
Standard deviation 22,7 25,7 25,2 24,1 
 
T-Test 4,44*** -4,78*** 0,22 
 
T-values that are statistically significant are marked with asterix. 1 % (***) 5 % (**) 10 % (*). 
 
The presence of firm size effect can be also seen from the correlation table. Table 4 
presents correlations between different variables and the t-values for those correlations. 
This time size measures: total assets and revenue are in the logarithmic form in order to 
avoid a bias caused by extreme values. However, these two variables together with number 
of employees all have negative and in most cases statistically significant correlation with 
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both of the performance measures. It is noticeable that TE-grade has a large and highly 
significant correlation with the profitability measure ROA. Although TE-grade includes 
ROI, which is relatively close to ROA, a correlation of 63 % is still high. A high 
correlation can lead to a situation where there is no variation between the two performance 
measures. In the multivariate tests, I test and see if this is the case.  
 
Table 4. Correlation table. 
  
ROA 
% 
TE-
grade 
Log 
Revenue 
Log 
Total 
Assets 
No. of 
employees 
Solvency 
ratio % 
Family 
firm 
Foreign 
owners 
State-
owned 
ROA % 1,00 
        -----  
        
TE-grade 0,63 1,00 
       
39,52 -----  
       
Log 
Revenue 
-0,03 -0,12 1,00 
      -1,36 -5,75 -----  
      
Log Total 
Assets 
-0,13 -0,18 0,79 1,00 
     
-6,39 -8,78 62,64 -----  
     
No. of 
employees 
-0,04 -0,02 0,54 0,50 1,00 
    -1,99 -0,76 31,09 27,91 -----  
    
Solvency 
ratio % 
0,22 0,32 -0,05 -0,04 -0,05 1,00 
   
11,13 16,26 -2,56 -2,09 -2,23 -----  
   
Family firm -0,04 0,13 -0,05 -0,10 -0,02 0,12 1,00 
  -1,74 6,54 -2,52 -4,72 -0,89 6,09 -----  
  
Foreign 
owners 
0,15 0,08 -0,20 -0,24 -0,14 -0,13 -0,40 1,00 
 
7,57 3,74 -9,77 -11,78 -6,78 -6,56 -21,25 -----  
 
State-owned 
 
0,03 -0,09 0,01 0,13 -0,02 -0,03 -0,21 -0,22 1,00 
1,46 -4,21 0,39 6,33 -1,03 -1,33 -10,21 -10,96 -----  
T-values that are statistically significant at 5 % level are bolded.  
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In table 4 I examine how different firms with different owners perform compared to all 
TE500 firms. Especially I am interested on how family firms perform against other 
companies. Compared to firms with foreign ownership and state-owned firms, family firms 
have higher TE-grade, but smaller ROA. The positive correlation with TE-grade is highly 
significant, whereas the negative correlation with ROA is insignificant. Firms with foreign 
ownership have both statistically significant positive correlations. Particularly ROA for 
firms with foreign ownership is higher than for other companies. This could be an indicator 
that whereas family firms are more concerned about solvency and current ratios in order to 
keep to business operative for future generations, foreign investors pay more attention to 
profitability and maximizing their own value from the company.  
7.2 Multivariate tests 
In the multivariate testing, I use the same model described in the methods section where I 
use ROA and TE-grade as performance measures. I test to see what kind of correlations 
different ownership types have for the performance measures in this model, especially I am 
interested about family ownership. Furthermore, I examine if the multivariate tests are 
coherent with the univariate tests, or are there any discrepancy between these results. The 
results from multivariate tests should give more thorough results where to conduct 
conclusions than univariate tests.  
Regression results with ROA as an independent variable are presented in table 5. I use 
period fixed effects and correct heteroscedasticity with White-cross section. Because ROA 
is not available in our database for all of the firm year observations, the total number of 
firm-year observations for table 5 is 3429. Some of the firms might not have nine years of 
recorded operating due to mergers and acquisitions or other reasons. Also the University’s 
database (orbis) might lack some information. 
All of the ownership types have statically significant positive correlation with ROA. 
Compared to previous results from tables 3 and 4, the results from table 5 are mostly 
congruent with univariate tests. Family firms do have the lowest ROA in the comparison 
group. The average ROA for family firms was below the average of all firms so the 
positive coefficient can be seen as a bit of a surprise. State-owned firms have the highest 
coefficient together with firms with foreign ownership that are both statistically highly 
significant. Size of the firm measured with the logarithm of total asset have a negative 
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effect on ROA, whereas the logarithm of revenue and the number of employees are 
positively correlated with ROA. The biggest deficiency in our model seems to be the 
adjusted R-square which tells that my model explains only 12 % of the ROA. In the robust 
tests I examine if this has any effect on the results.  
 
Table 5. Regression results with ROA as an independent variable.  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     Intercept 5,27 2,94 1,79* 0,073 
Family Firm 0,74 0,30 2,42** 0,015 
Foreign owner 4,35 0,25 17,45*** 0,000 
State-owned 4,89 0,34 14,51*** 0,000 
Log Total Assets -4,08 0,43 -9,47*** 0,000 
Log Revenue 3,23 0,26 12,54** 0,000 
No. of employees 0,00 0,00 2,89*** 0,004 
Solvency ratio % 0,15 0,01 17,82*** 0,000 
     R-squared 0,125     Mean dependent var. 7,38 
Adjusted R-squared 0,121     S.D. dependent var. 12,53 
T-values that are statistically significant are marked with asterix. 1 % (***) 5 % (**) 10 % (*). Total number 
of observations is 3429. 
 
Compared to ROA, using TE-grade as an independent variable gets very similar results, 
that are presented in table 6. TE-grade is available for 2350 firm-years. All of the 
ownership types have again positive coefficient with TE-grade. Although this time for 
state-owned firms it is not statistically significant. Furthermore, coefficients in the table 6 
are smaller than in table 5, this can be because TE-grade varies only between 4 and 10, 
while ROA has values from -80 % to 95 %. Adjusted R-square is marginally higher for the 
model with TE-grade. Another significant factor is the number of firm-year observations 
that is smaller for TE-grade. Talouselämä 500 –magazine has not reported TE-grade for all 
of the companies for unknown reasons. I use only the firm-years where TE-grade is 
available and exclude other firm-years from the regression.  
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Table 6. Regression results with TE-grade as an independent variable.  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     Intercept 9,33 0,35 26,38*** 0,000 
Family Firm 0,44 0,05 9,00*** 0,000 
Foreign owner 0,45 0,04 11,12*** 0,000 
State-owned 0,06 0,04 1,57 0,117 
Log Total Assets -0,43 0,07 -5,97*** 0,000 
Log Revenue 0,10 0,07 1,43 0,152 
No. of employees 0,00 0,00 10,50*** 0,000 
Solvency ratio % 0,02 0,00 18,74*** 0,000 
     R-squared 0,178     Mean dependent var. 7,81 
Adjusted R-squared 0,173     S.D. dependent var. 1,37 
T-values that are statistically significant are marked with asterix. 1 % (***) 5 % (**) 10 % (*). Total number 
of observations is 2350. 
Overall the results from the regressions show that family firms do outperform the sample 
of all firms. However, they do not outperform firms with foreign ownership and they 
underperform also to state-owned firms in profitability which is a bit of a surprise based on 
the previous studies Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) and Ding et al. (2008). Only variable 
that has a negative correlation with firm performance is total assets. Bigger the total assets 
are, worse the company will perform.  
7.3 Robust tests  
To test the robustness of the regression results, I do some modifications to the dataset and 
use cross-section weights. This dramatically increases the adjusted R-square of the model. 
I have excluded the lowest and highest extreme 5 % values for both performance measures. 
For table 7, I also reduced the number of observations to see if there is difference in the 
results by modifying the sample. I used firm-year observations only for the years where 
TE-grade number was also available. So the years where only ROA was available are 
excluded from the regression in table 7. Hence, the total number of firm-year observation 
is 2043. Using a smaller sample increases adjusted R-square and makes the significance 
levels slightly smaller. By using the whole dataset and excluding the extreme 5 % 
observations (total sample of 3089 firm-year observations), only significant change is that 
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coefficient for family firm would be significant at 5 % level. All other variables are stable, 
and there is no significant change in the coefficients so I do not report these results 
separately in any table.  
Even after the robustness test for ROA, family firms have positive coefficient, although not 
as significant as before. Same has happened to other variables as well. Adjusted R-square 
is significantly higher and the significance levels for all but total assets and number of 
employees have dropped. After the robustness check, state ownership has no significant 
correlation with ROA anymore. The results of family firms outperforming state-owned 
firms correlate with studies Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) and Ding, Zhang and Zhang 
(2008). Firms with foreign ownership still have a significantly positive correlation with 
ROA.  
 
Table 7. Regression results with ROA as an independent variable. Quantile values for top 
and bottom 5 % are excluded.  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     Intercept 20,89 1,23 16,96*** 0,000 
Family Firm 0,38 0,22 1,71* 0,087 
Foreign owner 2,87 0,27 10,79*** 0,000 
State-owned 0,09 0,21 0,41 0,680 
Log Total Assets -3,51 0,16 -21,32*** 0,000 
Log Revenue 1,47 0,23 6,29*** 0,000 
No. of employees 0,00 0,00 10,54*** 0,000 
Solvency ratio % 0,04 0,00 11,81*** 0,000 
    R-squared 0,726     Mean dependent var. 10,07 
Adjusted R-squared 0,725     S.D. dependent var. 19,52 
T-values that are statistically significant are marked with asterix. 1 % (***) 5 % (**) 10 % (*). Total number 
of observations is 2043. 
 
Compared to table 6 with TE-grade as an independent variable, table 8 reports analogous 
results. Coefficient for family firms remains significantly positive even after the robustness 
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test. Only insignificant variable in the model is state-ownership. Eliminating top and 
bottom 5 % quantiles does not seem to have a significant effect on the results. Coefficients 
are more the same than in table 6. T-statistics are a little bit higher, but no significant 
change can be reported.  Using cross-section weights increases the adjusted R-square but it 
appears to have no notable effect on the results.   However, while family firms outperform 
against the whole sample, they still underperform against firms with foreign ownership. 
The difference in the coefficients is not large, but still notable. Especially when the average 
TE-grade was higher for family firms it is interesting to see that in the multivariate model, 
firms with foreign ownership have higher performance measures. In addition, solvency 
ratio that is positively correlated with TE-grade, has higher correlation with family firms 
and is bigger in previous tables for family firms does not explain the difference between 
family firms and firms with foreign ownership anymore.  
  
Table 8. Regression results with TE-grade as an independent variable. Quantile values for 
top and bottom 5 % are excluded.  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     Intercept 10,27 0,20 51,20*** 0,000 
Family Firm 0,45 0,03 12,97*** 0,000 
Foreign owner 0,58 0,04 14,53*** 0,000 
State-owned 0,05 0,04 1,34 0,180 
Log Total Assets -0,59 0,05 -11,60*** 0,000 
Log Revenue 0,18 0,05 3,50*** 0,001 
No. of employees 0,00 0,00 14,61*** 0,000 
Solvency ratio % 0,02 0,00 22,03*** 0,000 
     R-squared 0,364     Mean dependent var. 10,89 
Adjusted R-squared 0,362     S.D. dependent var. 8,01 
T-values that are statistically significant are marked with asterix. 1 % (***) 5 % (**) 10 % (*). Total number 
of observations is 2144. 
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8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this thesis is to find if the ownership structure of the firm affects firm’s 
performance. To precise, this thesis focuses on family ownership and compares family 
firms against other companies. The data is collected using Talouselämä 500 –list (2015), 
which includes 500 biggest companies in Finland. Financial firms are excluded from the 
sample. The time period for my research is 2006–2014. Families represent the largest share 
of owners of the companies around the world. In Finland families own around 30 % of the 
biggest companies. The taxation for family firms is a constant political topic in Finland. 
Finnish Family Firm Association argues, that it is beneficial for the family firms and 
Finnish economy if the family business is able to keep operating under the next generation. 
Opposite opinions claim that there is no reason why family firms should have tax reliefs in 
order to keep the business in the family and that all owners, big and small should be treated 
equally.  
This thesis will give insight on whether it would be beneficiary for Finnish economy to 
support family firms. In addition to family firms, I categorize two other main ownership 
types in Finnish markets; State-owned firms and firms with foreign investors as large 
owners. I compare the results from these ownership types using two different performance 
measures. The first performance measure I use is ROA and the second is TE-grade that is 
created by Talouselämä 500 –magazine. TE-grade is a combination of profitability, 
solvency and liquidity where profitability (ROI) is weighted by 2 and it can take values 
from 4 to 10. To my knowledge, this measure has never been used in the previous research 
papers and it is only available for TE500 (500 biggest companies in Finland).  
The theoretical framework for this thesis is agency theory. According to agency theory, the 
separation of ownership and management in the company leads to a conflict of interests 
between owners and managers (type I agency problem). Owners are therefore forced to 
find ways to make sure the managers are working for the best of the owners and not for 
themselves. This rises costs for the owners that literature knows as agency costs. Based on 
agency theory, concentrated ownership is more favorable form of ownership than widely 
held. I also introduce agency problems between large and small owners (type II agency 
problem). Because I do not concentrate on the valuation of the firm in the empirical part 
for the reason that not all of the firms in my sample are listed, I leave type II agency 
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problems on a less notice. Furthermore, I give a quick insight to agency cost of debt, a 
relatively new concept in the financial literature that examines if the cost of debt is 
dependent of the ownership status of the firm.  
Family firms are the most numerous group of companies that represent concentrated 
ownership. In addition to agency theory, family firms have other unique features that are 
observed in this thesis. On the plus side, family firms have longer time horizon with 
investment and business operations. Family firms also have known owners, so they are not 
like the big faceless multinational corporations. These make family firms a pleasant 
business partner. On the minus side, having a large owner maximizing their own interests 
can hurt minor shareholders. Concentrated ownership often leads to illiquid share and 
affect other will to bid for the company. This hurts the company value. Families generally 
control the business by holding some of the top management positions. By doing so there 
is a risk that the person choose to hold the position because of the surname, does not have 
the needed knowledge. In conclusion, family ownership has both benefits and costs.  
Previous literature gives a good overview of the issue and basis for the empirical part. 
Studies from three different continents (US, Europe and Asia) vary partly from each other 
but include common findings as well. Based on the previous literature, the common view is 
that family firms outperform other firms. Studies also verify the founder effect. If a firm is 
still managed by the founder, the results for firm performance are significantly higher than 
for other firms. Some paper claim that the founder effect is the mere reason for the superior 
performance by family firms (Miller et al. (2007) and Villalonga and Amit (2006)). When 
the business is managed by the descendants of the founder, the results from previous 
studies vary more. It is essential that if the descendants take a controlling role in the 
company, they should have the skills to hold that position. Otherwise the company will 
face the “incompetent son –problem” and the firm performance will suffer. Furthermore, it 
seems that for the minority shareholders it is important that the shareholder protection is on 
a good level, or otherwise large shareholders (families) can exploit their position at the 
expense of the minority shareholders.  
The results from the empirical part show that in Finland family firms outperform other 
firms. This conclusion is more pronounced with TE-grade as the performance measure. 
Part of the reason is that family firms have higher solvency ratio that is included in the TE-
grade. The results hold even after the robustness tests. Compared to other ownership types, 
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family firms have significantly lower firm profitability (ROA) against the firms that have 
foreign owner. Additionally, firms with foreign ownership have higher TE-grade, but the 
difference is far smaller than for ROA. Firms with foreign ownership are on average a lot 
smaller than family firms and especially smaller than state-owned firms that represent the 
largest companies in the sample. The size measure total assets has a largely negative 
impact on the firm performance. Against state-owned firms, family firms have smaller 
ROA, but after the robustness tests this difference becomes questionable. In summary for 
an investor it would be wise to invest to a company that has a large foreign owner. Even 
so, family firms outperform when compared to the whole sample and especially they 
succeed when the performance is measured with TE-grade. 
This thesis does not separate family firms into categories, thus founder-family firms and 
family firms managed by the descendants are in the same group. For further research, it 
would be interesting to see if the results from other countries are coherent with Finnish 
markets. It would also be better to answer the question if family succession should be 
supported by the government or not. Firms with different owners seem to separate from 
each other at least in the size. Ownership rarely affects the performance as it is, but through 
other factors, i.e. size, liquidity and capital ratio. To be able to know how a different 
ownership changes the way the business operates would give an insight on what are the 
factors that lead to a better performance.  
 
 
 
 
54 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Adams, R., Almeida, H. & Ferreira, D., 2009. Understanding the relationship between 
founder–CEOs and firm performance. Journal of empirical Finance 16:1, 136-150. 
Ali, A., T. Chen & S. Radhakrishnan (2007). Corporate disclosures by family firms. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 44:1-2, 238-286. 
Almeida, H.V. & D. Wolfenzon (2006). A theory of pyramidal ownership and family 
business groups. The Journal of Finance 61:6, 2637-2680.  
Andres, C. (2008). Large shareholders and firm performance—An empirical examination    
   of founding-family ownership. Journal of Corporate Finance 14, 431-445. 
Anderson, R.C. & D.M. Reeb (2003). Founding-family ownership and firm performance: 
Evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance 58:3, 1301-1328. 
Anderson, R.C., S. Mansi & D.M. Reeb (2003). Founding family ownership and the 
agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics 68:2, 263-285. 
Ang, J.S., R.A. Cole & J.W. Lin (2000). Agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of 
Finance 55:1, 81-106. 
Attig, N., Fong, W.M., Gadhoum, Y. & Lang, L.H., 2006. Effects of large shareholding on 
information asymmetry and stock liquidity. Journal of Banking and Finance, 30:10, 
2875-2892. 
Barclay, M. & C. Holderness (1989). Private benefits from control of public corporations. 
Journal of Financial Economics 25:2, 371-395. 
Barontini, R. & L. Caprio (2006). The effect of family control on firm value and 
performance: evidence from continental Europe. European Financial Management 
12:5, 689–723. 
Barth, E., T. Gulbrandsen & P. Schone (2005). Family ownership and productivity: the role     
   of owner-management. Journal of Corporate Finance 11:1/2, 107–127. 
 
55 
 
 
 
 
Berk, J., P, DeMarzo & J. Harford (2012). Fundamentals of Corporate Finance. 2. Painos. 
Harlow: Pearson education 
Berle, A. & G. Means (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Harcourt, 
Brace, and World, New York, NY. 
Bhide, A., 1993. The hidden costs of stock market liquidity. Journal of financial 
economics, 34(1), pp.31-51. 
Bodie, Z., A. Kane & A. J. Marcus (2014). Investments. 10th edition. New York: McGraw-
Hill. 
Brealey, R., S. Myers & F. Allen (2011). Principles of Corporate Finance. 10th edition. 
New York etc.: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. 
Chu, W. (2011). Family ownership and firm performance: Influence of family 
management, family control, and firm size. Asia Pacific Journal of Management 
28:4, 833–851. 
Copeland, T. E., J. F. Weston & K. Shastri (2005). Financial Theory and Corporate 
Policy. 4th edition. Boston: Addison Wesley. 
Cucculelli, M. & G. Micucci (2008). Family succession and firm performance: Evidence 
from Italian family firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14:1, 17-31. 
DeAngelo, H. & L. DeAngelo (2000). Controlling stockholders and the disciplinary role of 
corporate payout policy: a study of the Times Mirror Company. Journal of Financial 
Economics 56:2, 153-207. 
Dewenter, K.L. & H.P. Malatesta (2001). "State-owned and privately owned firms: An 
empirical analysis of profitability, leverage, and labor intensity." The American 
Economic Review 91:1, 320-334. 
Demsetz, H. & K. Lehn (1985). The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and 
consequences. Journal of Political Economy 93:6, 1155-1177. 
Demsetz, H. & B. Villalonga (2001). Ownership structure and corporate performance. 
Journal of Corporate Finance 7:3, 209–333. 
 
56 
 
 
 
 
Ding, Y., H. Zhang & J. Zhang (2008). The financial and operating performance of 
Chinese family-owned listed firms. Management International Review 48:3, 297-
318. 
European Commission (2016). Family business: Promoting entrepreneurship [online]. 
Available from World Wide Web: <http://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/promoting-
entrepreneurship/we-work-for/family-business/index_en.htm>. 
Faccio, M. & L.H.P. Lang (2002). The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 65: 365-395. 
Fama, E. & M. Jensen (1985). Organizational forms and investment decisions. Journal of 
Financial Economics 14:1, 101-119. 
Fan, J.P.H & T.J. Wong (2002). Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of 
accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33:3, 401-
425. 
Grossman, S. & O. Hart (1986). The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical 
and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy 94:4, 691–719. 
Hansson, M., E. Liljeblom, & M. Martikainen (2011). Corporate governance and 
profitability in family SMEs. The European Journal of Finance 17:5-6, 391-408. 
Heinonen, J. (2003). Quo vadis suomalainen perheyritys? Kirjapaino Grafia. 224p.  
Hillier, D. & P. McColgan (2009). Firm performance and managerial succession in family 
managed firms. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 36:3, 461–84. 
Ibrahim, H. and F.A. Samad (2011). Corporate governance mechanisms and performance 
of public-listed family-ownership in Malaysia. International Journal of Economics 
and Finance 3:1, 105-115. 
Jensen, M.C. & W.H. Meckling (1976). The theory of firm: managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360. 
Jiang, Y. & M.W. Peng (2011). Are family ownership and control in large firms good, bad, 
or irrelevant? Asia Pacific Journal of Management 28:1, 15–39. 
 
57 
 
 
 
 
Kinnunen, J., E. K. Laitinen, T. Laitinen, J. Leppiniemi & V. Puttonen (2010). Avain 
laskentatoimeen ja rahoitukseen. 4th edition. Keuruu: Otavan Kirjapaino Oy.  
Knupfer, S. & V. Puttonen (2012). Moderni rahoitus. 6th edition. Helsinki: Sanoma Pro 
   Oy. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes & A. Shleifer (1999). Corporate ownership around the 
world. Journal of Finance 54:2, 471–517. 
Masulis R.W, C. Wang & F. Xie (2009). Agency problems at dual-class companies. The 
Journal of Finance 64:4, 1697-1727. 
Maury, B. (2006). Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from 
Western European corporations. Journal of Corporate Finance 12:2, 321-341 
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., Lester, R.H. & Cannella, A.A., 2007. Are family firms 
really superior performers? Journal of corporate finance, 13(5), pp.829-858. 
Pérez-González F. (2006). Inherited Control and Firm. The American Economic Review 
96:5, 1559-1588. 
Pöysä, E. (2015). Talouselämä 500 (Talouselämä yritysraportti 2015). Helsinki: Talentum. 
978-952-14-2778-7. 
Ross S., R. Westerfield & B. Jordan (2013). Fundamentals of Corporate Finance. 10th 
edition. New York: McGraw‐Hill Companies inc.   
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. (1986). Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of 
Political Economics 94, 461–488. 
Sraer, D. & D. Thesmar (2007). Performance and behavior of family firms: evidence from 
the french stock market. Journal of the European Economic Association 5:4, 709-
751. 
Tourunen, K (2009). Perheyritykset kansantaloudessa. Yritysten omistus, toiminnan 
laajuus ja kannattavuus Suomessa 2000-luvun alussa. Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriön 
julkaisuja 53:2009. 
 
58 
 
 
 
 
Villalonga, B. & R. Amit (2006). How do family ownership, management, and control 
affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics 80:2, 385–417. 
 
59 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Observed companies and ownership status.  
 COMPANY OWNERSHIP STATUS 
1. NOKIA OYJ      Other 
2. NESTE OYJ      Other 
3. STORA ENSO OYJ      Other 
4. UPM-KYMMENE OYJ      Other 
5. KESKO OYJ      Other 
6. KONE OYJ Family firm       
7. SUOMEN OSUUSKAUPPOJEN 
KESKUSKUNTA 
     Other 
8. OUTOKUMPU OYJ      Other 
9. MICROSOFT MOBILE OY  Foreign owner     
10. NORTH EUROPEAN OIL 
TRADE OY 
     Other 
11. WARTSILA OYJ  Foreign owner     
12. METSALIITTO OSUUSKUNTA      Other 
13. ST1 GROUP OY Family firm       
14. CARGOTEC OYJ Family firm       
15. FORTUM OYJ    State-owned   
16. ST1 NORDIC OY Family firm       
17. METSO OYJ      Other 
18. VALMET OYJ      Other 
19. HUHTAMAKI OYJ      Other 
20. AMER SPORTS OYJ      Other 
21. ABB OY  Foreign owner     
22. CAVERION OYJ      Other 
23. KEMIRA OYJ Family firm       
24. OY TEBOIL AB  Foreign owner     
25. FINNAIR OYJ    State-owned   
26. VALIO OY      Other 
27. WIHURI OY Family firm       
28. OY VEIKKAUS AB    State-owned   
29. KONECRANES OYJ      Other 
30. POSTI GROUP OYJ    State-owned   
31. ORION OYJ      Other 
32. HOK-ELANTO 
LIIKETOIMINTA OY 
     Other 
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33. ONVEST OY Family firm       
34. HKSCAN OYJ      Other 
35. OY KARL FAZER AB Family firm       
36. SSAB EUROPE OY  Foreign owner     
37. LEMMINKAINEN OYJ Family firm       
38. LUVATA OY  Foreign owner     
39. SANOMA OYJ Family firm       
40. YIT OYJ      Other 
41. SUPERCELL OY  Foreign owner     
42. ORIOLA-KD OYJ      Other 
43. VR-YHTYMA OY    State-owned   
44. STOCKMANN OYJ ABP      Other 
45. ATRIA OYJ      Other 
46. ELISA OYJ      Other 
47. TELIASONERA FINLAND OYJ  Foreign owner     
48. TIETO OYJ      Other 
49. AHLSTROM CAPITAL OY Family firm       
50. LIDL SUOMI 
KOMMANDIITTIYHTIO 
 Foreign owner     
51. TAMRO OYJ  Foreign owner     
52. NOKIAN RENKAAT OYJ      Other 
53. ALKO OY    State-owned   
54. GASUM OY  Foreign owner     
55. OUTOTEC OYJ      Other 
56. VEHO OY AB Family firm       
57. MUNKSJO OYJ  Foreign owner   Other 
58. SUOMEN LAHIKAUPPA OY  Foreign owner     
59. FISKARS OYJ ABP Family firm     Other 
60. AHLSTROM OYJ      Other 
61. RETTIG GROUP OY AB Family firm       
62. UPONOR OYJ Family firm     Other 
63. OSUUSKAUPPA 
HAMEENMAA 
     Other 
64. SKANSKA OY  Foreign owner     
65. HANKKIJA OY  Foreign owner     
66. PAULIG AB Family firm       
67. DNA OY      Other 
68. PKC GROUP OYJ      Other 
69. RAHA-
AUTOMAATTIYHDISTYS 
   State-owned   
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70. PIRKANMAAN 
OSUUSKAUPPA 
     Other 
71. YARA SUOMI OY  Foreign owner     
72. NORILSK NICKEL 
HARJAVALTA OY 
 Foreign owner     
73. TUKO LOGISTICS 
OSUUSKUNTA 
     Other 
74. TOKMANNI OY  Foreign owner     
75. OSUUSKAUPPA ARINA      Other 
76. BAYER OY  Foreign owner     
77. NCC RAKENNUS OY  Foreign owner     
78. CONSOLIS OY AB  Foreign owner     
79. PLANMECA OY Family firm       
80. SANITEC OYJ  Foreign owner     
81. KAUPPAHUONE 
LAAKKONEN OY 
Family firm       
82. SRV YHTIOT OYJ Family firm       
83. KUUSAKOSKI GROUP OY Family firm       
84. POHJOLAN VOIMA OY      Other 
85. OSUUSKAUPPA KPO      Other 
86. ROLLS-ROYCE OY AB  Foreign owner     
87. CRAMO OYJ      Other 
88. SANDVIK MINING AND 
CONSTRUCTION OY 
 Foreign owner     
89. OSUUSKAUPPA KESKIMAA      Other 
90. LASSILA and TIKANOJA OYJ      Other 
91. TURUN OSUUSKAUPPA      Other 
92. RAMIRENT OYJ      Other 
93. DT FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
94. OSUUSKAUPPA PEEASSA      Other 
95. FINGRID OYJ    State-owned   
96. TIKKURILA OYJ      Other 
97. DELTA MOTOR GROUP OY  Foreign owner     
98. POYRY OYJ Family firm     Other 
99. ISS PALVELUT OY  Foreign owner     
100. 3STEP IT GROUP OY Family firm       
101. VAPO OY    State-owned   
102. MEYER TURKU OY  Foreign owner     
103. VIKING LINE ABP      Other 
104. YLEISRADIO OY    State-owned   
105. PATRIA OYJ    State-owned   
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106. SUUR-SEUDUN 
OSUUSKAUPPA SSO 
     Other 
107. RAISIO OYJ      Other 
108. TRADEKA-YHTIOT OY      Other 
109. KYMEN SEUDUN 
OSUUSKAUPPA 
     Other 
110. FINNLINES OYJ  Foreign owner     
111. ETELA-POHJANMAAN 
OSUUSKAUPPA 
     Other 
112. LUJATALO OY Family firm       
113. ANDRITZ OY  Foreign owner     
114. SALCOMP OYJ  Foreign owner     
115. FINNFROST OY      Other 
116. COMPONENTA OYJ Family firm       
117. ALTIA OYJ    State-owned   
118. GIGANTTI OY AB  Foreign owner     
119. CGI SUOMI OY  Foreign owner     
120. ALSO NORDIC HOLDING OY  Foreign owner     
121. PAROC GROUP OY  Foreign owner     
122. PONSSE OYJ Family firm     Other 
123. VACON OYJ  Foreign owner     
124. VATTENFALL OY  Foreign owner     
125. SCHENKER OY  Foreign owner     
126. ASPO OYJ      Other 
127. SUOMINEN OYJ      Other 
128. TOYOTA AUTO FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
129. SAPPI FINLAND OPERATIONS 
OY 
 Foreign owner     
130. VVO-YHTYMA OYJ      Other 
131. ARLA OY  Foreign owner     
132. KWH-KONCERNEN AB Family firm       
133. WIKLOF HOLDING AB Family firm       
134. RAO NORDIC OY  Foreign owner     
135. SATAKUNNAN 
OSUUSKAUPPA 
     Other 
136. FUJITSU FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
137. TALLINK SILJA OY  Foreign owner     
138. FINAVIA OYJ    State-owned   
139. SLO OY  Foreign owner     
140. OSUUSKAUPPA SUUR-SAVO      Other 
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141. JOHN DEERE FORESTRY OY  Foreign owner     
142. OY SINEBRYCHOFF AB  Foreign owner     
143. HEWLETT-PACKARD OY  Foreign owner     
144. SCANFIL OYJ Family firm       
145. APETIT OYJ      Other 
146. R-KIOSKI OY  Foreign owner     
147. VOLVO CAR FINLAND OY AB  Foreign owner     
148. OSUUSKAUPPA 
VARUBODEN-OSLA 
HANDELSLAG 
     Other 
149. VALMET AUTOMOTIVE OY      Other 
150. OSUUSKUNTA KPY      Other 
151. FREEPORT COBALT OY  Foreign owner     
152. LVI-DAHL OY  Foreign owner     
153. OSUUSKUNTA ITAMAITO      Other 
154. SATO OYJ      Other 
155. VANTAAN ENERGIA OY    State-owned   
156. POHJOIS-KARJALAN 
OSUUSKAUPPA 
     Other 
157. KAYTTOAUTO OY Family firm       
158. TAMPEREEN SAHKOLAITOS 
OY 
   State-owned   
159. VERKKOKAUPPA.COM OYJ Family firm       
160. PRYSMIAN FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
161. ETELA-KARJALAN 
OSUUSKAUPPA 
     Other 
162. WALKI GROUP OY      Other 
163. IKEA OY  Foreign owner     
164. GE HEALTHCARE FINLAND 
OY 
 Foreign owner     
165. ELENIA OY  Foreign owner     
166. RUDUS OY  Foreign owner     
167. SUOMEN TERVEYSTALO OY  Foreign owner     
168. LINDSTROM OY Family firm       
169. OY SNELLMAN AB Family firm       
170. OTAVA OY Family firm       
171. ETOLA OY Family firm       
172. TEKNOS GROUP OY Family firm       
173. ARO-YHTYMA OY Family firm       
174. EM GROUP OY Family firm       
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175. AHLSELL OY  Foreign owner     
176. OY IBM FINLAND AB  Foreign owner     
177. VAISALA OYJ      Other 
178. VERSOWOOD OY Family firm       
179. UNILEVER FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
180. SAARIOINEN OY Family firm       
181. MAKITA OY  Foreign owner     
182. OLVI OYJ Family firm       
183. BERNER OY Family firm       
184. CITYCON OYJ      Other 
185. KOKKOLAN HALPA-HALLI 
OY 
Family firm       
186. SOLEMO Family firm       
187. MEHILAINEN OY  Foreign owner     
188. TECH DATA FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
189. PEAB OY  Foreign owner     
190. REDERIAKTIEBOLAGET 
ECKERO 
Family firm       
191. OY HARTWALL AB  Foreign owner     
192. ALMA MEDIA OYJ      Other 
193. AGCO POWER OY  Foreign owner     
194. HUNTSMAN PandA FINLAND 
OY 
     Other 
195. SIEMENS OSAKEYHTIO  Foreign owner     
196. METROAUTO GROUP OY Family firm       
197. ORAS INVEST OY Family firm       
198. BRP FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
199. HARTELA-YHTIOT OY Family firm       
200. OY TURKU ENERGIA-ABO 
ENERGI AB 
   State-owned   
201. ACCENTURE OY  Foreign owner     
202. EPV ENERGIA OY    State-owned   
203. RAPALA VMC OYJ  Foreign owner   Other 
204. WURTH OY  Foreign owner     
205. OSUUSKUNTA POHJOLAN 
MAITO 
     Other 
206. NORDIC REGIONAL 
AIRLINES OY 
 Foreign owner     
207. AURUBIS FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
208. ELTEL NETWORKS OY  Foreign owner     
209. L-FASHION GROUP OY Family firm       
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210. VIRALA OY AB Family firm       
211. SUOMEN NESTLE OY  Foreign owner     
212. SOUTHEAST TRADING OY        
213. HARJAVALTA OY Family firm       
214. KOSKITUKKI OY Family firm       
215. BROMAN GROUP OY Family firm       
216. PANASONIC MARKETING CIS 
OY 
 Foreign owner     
217. TUKKUHEINO OY Family firm       
218. BOREALIS POLYMERS OY  Foreign owner     
219. SCANIA SUOMI OY  Foreign owner     
220. MTV SISALLOT OY  Foreign owner     
221. CARUNA OY  Foreign owner     
222. FINTOTO OY    State-owned   
223. VAASAN OY  Foreign owner     
224. CONSTI YHTIOT OYJ      Other 
225. SPONDA OYJ      Other 
226. TELESTE OYJ      Other 
227. BOLIDEN KOKKOLA OY  Foreign owner     
228. RINTA-JOUPIN AUTOLIIKE 
OY 
Family firm       
229. OY L M ERICSSON AB  Foreign owner     
230. POLAR ELECTRO OY Family firm       
231. LANSIAUTO OY Family firm       
232. EMPOWER IN OY  Foreign owner     
233. OY FORD AB  Foreign owner     
234. BILLERUDKORSNAS 
FINLAND OY 
 Foreign owner     
235. EXPERT ASA OY  Foreign owner     
236. OY SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS 
AB 
 Foreign owner     
237. KAMUX OY Family firm       
238. EKOKEM OYJ    State-owned   
239. ATEA FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
240. BOLIDEN HARJAVALTA OY  Foreign owner     
241. AXUS FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
242. HARVESTIA OY        
243. OY BMW SUOMI AB  Foreign owner     
244. OY FINNMATKAT AB  Foreign owner     
245. REXEL FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
246. HELKAMA-AUTO OY Family firm       
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247. OY HALTON GROUP LTD Family firm       
248. PIHLAJALINNA OYJ      Other 
249. SAVON VOIMA OYJ    State-owned   
250. H and M HENNES and 
MAURITZ OY 
 Foreign owner     
251. JYVASKYLAN ENERGIA OY    State-owned   
252. LEHTO GROUP OYJ Family firm       
253. ATTENDO OY  Foreign owner     
254. PORI ENERGIA OY    State-owned   
255. NORMET GROUP OY Family firm       
256. VOLVO FINLAND  Foreign owner     
257. LAHTI ENERGIA OY    State-owned   
258. HELVAR MERCA OY AB Family firm       
259. OVAKO IMATRA OY AB  Foreign owner     
260. FORTACO GROUP OY      Other 
261. KYMPPIVOIMA HANKINTA 
OY 
   State-owned   
262. AGCO SUOMI OY  Foreign owner     
263. ENERGI FORSALJNING 
FINLAND OY 
     Other 
264. OY TRANSMERI GROUP AB Family firm       
265. ALGOL OY Family firm       
266. F9 DISTRIBUTION OY      Other 
267. OSUUSKUNTA MAITOSUOMI      Other 
268. JARMO RINTA-JOUPPI OY Family firm       
269. OY C.J. HARTMAN AB Family firm       
270. GOLDEN HEIGHTS OY  Foreign owner     
271. DHL FREIGHT (FINLAND) OY  Foreign owner     
272. CONTAINERSHIPS OYJ Family firm       
273. INSPECTA HOLDING OY  Foreign owner     
274. HELSINGIN KAUKOKIITO OY 
- HELSINGFORS FJARR-
EXPRESS AB 
     Other 
275. SUCROS OY  Foreign owner     
276. TS-YHTYMA OY Family firm       
277. OY AGA AB  Foreign owner     
278. OMNICOM MEDIA GROUP 
HOLDING OY 
 Foreign owner     
279. SUUR-SAVON SAHKO OY    State-owned   
280. E. HARTIKAINEN OY Family firm       
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281. OMYA OY  Foreign owner     
282. AB RANI PLAST OY Family firm       
283. OSUUSKAUPPA MAAKUNTA      Other 
284. NETS OY  Foreign owner     
285. FQM KEVITSA MINING OY  Foreign owner     
286. WETTERI OY Family firm       
287. TUIKE FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
288. OY KATTERNO AB    State-owned   
289. KEITELE FOREST OY Family firm       
290. BE GROUP OY AB  Foreign owner     
291. MAINTPARTNER GROUP OY      Other 
292. SALOMAA YHTIOT OY Family firm       
293. BARONA GROUP OY      Other 
294. ROVIO ENTERTAINMENT OY Family firm       
295. SCANDIC HOTELS OY  Foreign owner     
296. POLKKY OY Family firm       
297. ABLOY OY  Foreign owner     
298. KESKISUOMALAINEN OYJ      Other 
299. INTERNATIONAL PAPER 
NORDIC SALES COMPANY 
OY 
 Foreign owner     
300. ACCOUNTOR HOLDING OY Family firm       
301. LOISTE OY    State-owned   
302. FORCHEM OY  Foreign owner     
303. ERIKSSON CAPITAL AB Family firm       
304. HUURRE GROUP OY  Foreign owner     
305. TECHNOPOLIS OYJ      Other 
306. KIILTO FAMILY OY Family firm       
307. NCC ROADS OY  Foreign owner     
308. PEIKKO GROUP OY Family firm       
309. POWERFLUTE OYJ  Foreign owner     
310. PYHASALMI MINE OY  Foreign owner     
311. STEVECO OY      Other 
312. POLTTIMO OY Family firm       
313. DSV ROAD OY  Foreign owner     
314. OSUUSKUNTA TUOTTAJAIN 
MAITO 
     Other 
315. ENERGIAMEKLARIT OY      Other 
316. AIRBUS DEFENCE AND 
SPACE OY 
 Foreign owner     
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317. GS-HYDRO HOLDING OY  Foreign owner     
318. GRANIITTIRAKENNUS 
KALLIO OY 
     Other 
319. SGN GROUP OY Family firm       
320. NAMMO LAPUA OY  Foreign owner     
321. J. KARKKAINEN OY Family firm       
322. VAASAN SAHKO OY    State-owned   
323. THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC 
OY 
 Foreign owner     
324. OSUUSKAUPPA KEULA      Other 
325. KOIVUNEN OY Family firm       
326. SULZER PUMPS FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
327. SUOMALAINEN 
ENERGIAOSUUSKUNTA 
(SEO) 
     Other 
328. MOVENTAS GEARS OY  Foreign owner     
329. SECURITAS OY  Foreign owner     
330. WALLAC OY  Foreign owner     
331. JANSSEN-CILAG OY  Foreign owner     
332. FONECTA OY  Foreign owner     
333. AGNICO EAGLE FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
334. CP KELCO OY  Foreign owner     
335. ASUNTOSAATION 
ASUMISOIKEUS OY 
     Other 
336. CONTINEO OY      Other 
337. F-SECURE OYJ      Other 
338. PFIZER OY  Foreign owner     
339. PANOSTAJA OYJ      Other 
340. PORHON AUTOLIIKE OY Family firm       
341. ISKU-YHTYMA OY Family firm       
342. HOLIDAY CLUB RESORTS OY  Foreign owner     
343. RTV-YHTYMA OY Family firm       
344. LAPPEENRANNAN ENERGIA 
OY 
   State-owned   
345. NOVARTIS FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
346. BAUHAUS and CO. KY  Foreign owner     
347. LAMPOPUISTO OY      Other 
348. JATKE OY Family firm       
349. HUS-KIINTEISTOT OY    State-owned   
350. PALODEX GROUP OY  Foreign owner     
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351. EATON POWER QUALITY OY  Foreign owner     
352. CORIANT OY  Foreign owner     
353. ESPERI CARE OY      Other 
354. POHJOIS-KARJALAN SAHKO 
OY 
   State-owned   
355. TERVAKOSKI OY  Foreign owner     
356. TURUN SEUDUN 
ENERGIANTUOTANTO OY 
   State-owned   
357. BASWARE OYJ      Other 
358. KEMPPI OY Family firm       
359. MOLNLYCKE HEALTH CARE 
OY 
 Foreign owner     
360. ETTEPLAN OYJ Family firm       
361. OY TJAREBORG AB  Foreign owner     
362. BUSINESSFORUM OY  Foreign owner     
363. PUUKESKUS OY  Foreign owner     
364. PLUSTERVEYS OY        
365. ESPOON ASUNNOT OY    State-owned   
366. ADVEN OY  Foreign owner     
367. VELJEKSET KESKINEN OY Family firm       
368. STAFFPOINT HOLDING OY Family firm       
369. RAMBOLL FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
370. KSS ENERGIA OY    State-owned   
371. NORPE OY  Foreign owner     
372. FIRA OY      Other 
373. FINNSEMENTTI OY  Foreign owner     
374. OY NIZHEX SCANDINAVIA 
LTD 
 Foreign owner     
375. OSTP FINLAND OY AB  Foreign owner     
376. SAP FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
377. TECHNIP OFFSHORE 
FINLAND OY 
 Foreign owner     
378. SANTEN OY  Foreign owner     
379. OY EBOOKERS FINLAND LTD  Foreign owner     
380. BEWI STYROCHEM OY  Foreign owner     
381. SODEXO OY  Foreign owner     
382. MARTELA OYJ Family firm       
383. PRT-FOREST OY Family firm       
384. DANISCO SWEETENERS OY  Foreign owner     
385. HOLLMING OY Family firm       
386. FINNFEEDS OY  Foreign owner     
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387. AUTOSALPA OY Family firm       
388. CAPGEMINI FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
389. SAINT-GOBAIN WEBER OY 
AB 
 Foreign owner     
390. RAUTE OYJ      Other 
391. NORDIC MORNING OYJ    State-owned   
392. GLASTON OYJ ABP      Other 
393. NYNAS OY  Foreign owner     
394. INSTRU OPTIIKKA OY  Foreign owner     
395. SAINT-GOBAIN 
RAKENNUSTUOTTEET OY 
 Foreign owner     
396. PARKER HANNIFIN OY  Foreign owner     
397. OY KUEHNE + NAGEL LTD  Foreign owner     
398. GLAXOSMITHKLINE OY  Foreign owner     
399. BANG and BONSOMER 
GROUP AB 
Family firm       
400. KYMENLAAKSON SAHKO OY 
- KYMMENEDALENS EL AB 
   State-owned   
401. AMEC FOSTER WHEELER 
ENERGIA OY 
 Foreign owner     
402. FINN-POWER OY  Foreign owner     
403. BRONTO SKYLIFT OY AB  Foreign owner     
404. MURATA ELECTRONICS OY  Foreign owner     
405. RAUMASTER OY      Other 
406. ERNST and YOUNG OY  Foreign owner     
407. OY LIVAL AB Family firm       
408. A-LEHDET OY Family firm       
409. TA-YHTYMA OY      Other 
410. ANVIA OYJ      Other 
411. THE ORANGE COMPANY OY Family firm       
412. ATOY OY Family firm       
413. KYMPPIVOIMA OY    State-owned   
414. ROCLA OY  Foreign owner     
415. DOVRE GROUP OYJ      Other 
416. AFFECTO OYJ      Other 
417. OSUUSKUNTA LANSI-MAITO      Other 
418. DOW SUOMI OY  Foreign owner     
419. WESTAS GROUP OY Family firm       
420. HES-PRO (FINLAND) OY Family firm       
421. WHIRLPOOL NORDIC OY  Foreign owner     
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422. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER
S OY 
 Foreign owner     
423. MARIOFF CORPORATION OY  Foreign owner     
424. LINDORFF OY  Foreign owner     
425. ORKLA CONFECTIONERY and 
SNACKS FINLAND AB 
 Foreign owner     
426. INCHCAPE MOTORS 
FINLAND OY 
 Foreign owner     
427. REKA OY Family firm       
428. KPMG OY AB      Other 
429. FLAKT WOODS OY  Foreign owner     
430. DIGIA OYJ      Other 
431. OY ELECTROLUX AB  Foreign owner     
432. CABB FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
433. OY MOBILITY FINLAND AB      Other 
434. VASKILUODON VOIMA OY    State-owned   
435. LIQVIA HOLDINGS OY  Foreign owner     
436. ORKLA FOODS FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
437. SAMPO-ROSENLEW OY Family firm       
438. OY SAMLINK AB      Other 
439. LUMON INVEST OY Family firm       
440. TRANSTECH OY Family firm       
441. REALIA HOLDING OY      Other 
442. SKS GROUP OY Family firm       
443. SUOMEN EUROMASTER  
OY 
 Foreign owner     
444. CUPORI OY  Foreign owner     
445. JYSK OY  Foreign owner     
446. CATAMOUNT OY Family firm       
447. METOS OY AB  Foreign owner     
448. CLOETTA SUOMI OY  Foreign owner     
449. ISOJOEN KONEHALLI OY Family firm       
450. JUJO THERMAL OY  Foreign owner     
451. BROADCOM 
COMMUNICATIONS FINLAND 
OY 
 Foreign owner     
452. BURGER-IN OY Family firm       
453. PILKINGTON AUTOMOTIVE 
FINLAND OY 
 Foreign owner     
454. MARIMEKKO OYJ      Other 
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455. POHJOIS-KARJALAN 
KIRJAPAINO OYJ 
Family firm       
456. FINNVERA PLC    State-owned   
457. SKAALA OY Family firm       
458. A-KATSASTUS OY  Foreign owner     
459. BITTIUM OYJ      Other 
460. DELETE FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
461. MEHILAINEN 
TERVEYSPALVELUT OY 
     Other 
462. ALANDS 
PENNINGAUTOMATFORENIN
G 
       
463. KOIVISTON AUTO OY Family firm       
464. TAMINCO FINLAND OY  Foreign owner     
465. HONG KONG SUOMI OY Family firm       
466. GOVERNIA OY    State-owned   
467. DENTSU AEGIS NETWORK 
OY 
 Foreign owner     
468. BASSADONE AUTOMOTIVE 
NORDIC OY 
 Foreign owner     
 
 
